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Gabrielski and Fanucci: Taxation

TAXATION
I. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED EXPENDITURES MAY
LEAD TO DEDUCTIONS OR EXCLUSIONS IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
Recently, in Coombs v. Commissionerl and Folkman v.
United States, 2 the Ninth Circuit ruled on the deductibility of
travel expenditures pursuant to I.R.C. section 162(a)(2)S in the
context of the location of a taxpayer's "tax home." In another
case, Sibla v. Commissioner, 4 the court determined whether a
taxpayer's payments into a mandatory meal plan at his place of
employment could be deducted from income pursuant to I.R.C.
section 162(a),IS or excluded from income under I.R.C. section
'119. 6
1. 608 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wallace, J.i the other panel members were
Trask, J., and Zirpoli, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. 615 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were
Browning, J., and Bartels, D.J., sitting by designation).
3. I.R.C. § .162 provides in pertinent part:
(a) in general-There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for
meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business • • • •
4. Sibla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Curtis, D.J., sitting by
designation; Kennedy J., dissenting; the other. panel member was Tang, J.).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. I.R.C. § 119 provides in pertinent part:
(a) There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him, his
spouse, or any other of his dependents by or on behalf of his
employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the
business premises of the employer. • • •
(b)(3) Certain fixed charges for meals.(A) In general -If(i) an employee is required to pay on a periodic basis a

•

383

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 14

384 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll:383

A. Coombs v. Commissioner
Background

All taxpayers? in Coombs were employees at the Nevada
Test Site,S a nuclear testing facility operated by the United
States government. Most of the taxpayers lived sixty-five miles
away in Las Vegas, Nevada, the closest habitable community to
the Test Site.9 Cox v. United States,lo the companion case to
Coombs, was based upon a similar factual situation.
Other than military personnel, there were 100 federal employees and 4,000 employees of private contractors who worked
at the Test Site.l l All employees received a per-diem Test Site
allowance,12 which was paid Without regard to the actual costs
fixed charge for his meals, and
(ii) such meals are furnished by the employer for the convenience of the employer, there shall be excluded from the
employee's gross income an amount equal to such fixed
charge.
(B) Application of subparagraph (A). Subparagraph (A)
shall apply(i) whether the employee pays the fixed charge out of his
stated compensation or out of his own funds, and'
(ii) only if the employee is required to make the payment
whether he accepts or declines the meals.
7. Unless a spouse of a taxpayer filing a joint return, all taxpayers were employed at
the Nevada Test Site. 608 F.2d at 1271.
8. Each of the taxpayers in question was an employee at the Nevada Test Site for at
least some time from 1970 through 1973. Although the government carried out other
activities at the Test Site, its primary use was as a nuclear testing facility. Because of the
dangers of such a facility, the government chose the Nevada desert location because it
was removed from populated areas. Id.
9. The primary entrance into the Test Site was the Camp Mercury Control Point,
located on its southernmost boundary. In order to reach the northernmost boundary, a
person must travel an additional 65 miles: The Test Site encompasses some 1,350 square
miles of remote Nevada desert. Aside from the primary entrance, there are two additional entrances, which are seldom used and therefore are of little importance to this
Note. See Coombs v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 426, 432 (1976).
10. 608 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. The taxpayers involved in this appeal were employees of private contractors or
construction workers who were members of craft unions. The craft union employees were
unable to avail themselves of a free bus service for transportation between the Camp
Mercury Control Point and their forward work stations on the Test Site, and also between work sites. However, they received an additional travel allowance. 608 F.2d at
1272.
12. Id. This Test Site allowance was additional to the taxpayers' regular wages and
was paid for each day that they reported to their work stations at the Test Site. The
amount paid varied depending upon the taxpayers' work station; those reporting to
Camp Mercury received $5.00 per day, while those reporting to any forward area re-
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incurred for transportation, meals, and lodging. IS
At times, the taxpayers' employers required them to perform overtime work at the Test Site. Due to the great distance
between their homes and the Site, some of the taxpayers who
worked overtime purchased meals at the Site. Additionally,
some rented lodging on the Site when they chose not to return
home after overtime work.I ' However, the Cox taxpayers kept no
records for these expenditures.
Both the district court in Cox, and the Tax Court in
Coombs, determined that the Test Site allowances were not excludable from income under section 119.111 Both courts also disallowed the taxpayers' claim to a deduction for travel expenses
incurred on commute between their residence and the Test Site
entrance, and those incurred between the Site entrance and
their forward work stations. The courts held that these were personal commuting expenses incurred in travel between the taxpayers' home and their place of employment, and were not deductible as ordinary 'and necessary business expenses. IS In
addition, both courts held that the taxpayers' "tax homes" were
on the Test Site, which precluded the 'taxpayers from meeting
the Correll "away from home overnight" test.1'l This finding, in
addition to what they found to be a lack of business purpose, led
the courts to disallow the taxpayers' claim to a deduction under
section 162 for meal and temporary lodging expenses' incurred at
the Test Site. IS The courts disallowed the claim regardless of
ceived $7.50 per day. Employees who were members of particular craft unions received
an additional travel allowance which varied in accordance with the location of their work
stations. ld. at 1271.
13. During the years in question, The Atomic Energy Commission also provided
subsidized transportation from Las Vegas to the Camp Mercury Control Point, and
points within the Test Site. However, the bus tr~portation was provided only to employees of the private contractors and the federal government. Construction workers who
were members of craft unions were not permitted to use the bus service. Coombs v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 433-34.
14. Taxpayers were able to rent sleeping quarters for overnight stay at rates varying
in amount between $1.00 and $2.00 per night. Cox v. United States, [78-2] U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 11 9572 at 84,834 (D. Nev. 1978).
15. ld. at 84,835; Coombs v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 427.
16. [78-2] U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,835-37; 67 T.C. at 473-80.
17. ld. See note 118 infra.
18. The courts based their holdings primarily on the fact that the taxpayers were
not required by their employers to stay overnight, and therefore the decision to stay
overnight was personal and not related to business. [78-2] U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,836-37; 67
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whether the taxpayers worked overtime, or whether they slept
overnight at the Test Site when they incurred these expenses.
One Job: Tax Home At Personal Residence

After initially recognizing the taxpayers' abandonment of
any claim to an exclusion from income under section 119,19 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the Cox taxpayers' contention 'that
overtime related expenses were deductible from income pursuant to the general provisions of section 162(a). Based upon the
Tax Court's decision in Sibla v. Commissioner,20 and Cooper v.
Commissioner,21 the taxpayers attempted to avoid the impact of
the rule that the mere requirement by an employer that an employee work overtime will not justify the employees' deduction
of meal expenses incurred at their place of work after the completion of their regular shift.u The court stated that even if they
affirmed Sibla and Cooper, those decisions provided for deductions only where the employer requires the employees to pay for
and receive meals froDl a particular source as a condition of employment.2S Simply that the taxpayers were required to work
overtime was not sufficient reason to deduct expenses for meals
and lodging pursuant to section 162(a).24
Additionally, Cox taxpayers argued that their overtime-related expenses were deductible under section 162(a) (2) as travel
T.C. at 477-S0.
19. 60S F.2d at 1272. The taxpayers' abandonment of their claim to an exclusion
under § 119 was based upon Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). Kowalski
had been decided subsequent to the district court's ruling in Coombs, but prior to the
Tax Court's decision in Cox. The Kowalski Court stated that "the form of section 119
which Congress enacted originated in the Senate and the report accompanying the Senate Bill is very clear: 'Section 119 applies only to meals or lodging furnished in kind.' S.
Rep. No. 1622, S3rd Congo 2d Sess., 190 (1954)." Id. at 84. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.1191(c)(2) (1964), 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1 (1977). In Kowalski, New Jersey State Troopers were
given a cash meal allowance. which was included in their salary checks, to spend on
meals during their meal breaks. Because the taxpayers' Test Site allowances were in cash
and not in kind, the Ninth Circuit held that they "have properly abandoned any claim to
exclusion .•. ." 60S F.2d at 1272.
20. 6S T.C. 422 (1977).
21. 67 T.C. 870 (1977).
22. Commissioner V. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1967) (dictum); Drill V.
Commissioner, ST.C. 902, 904 (1947).
23. 60S F.2d at 1273. The Cox taxpayers did not allege that they were required to
purchase overtime related Dleals or lodging at the Test Site as a condition of their
employment.
24. Id.
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expenses.25 In order to address this claim, the court looked to
Commissioner v. Flowers,26 where the Supreme Court established criteria for the deductibility of travel expenses. The expense must be a reasonable and necessary travel expense incurred "while away from home," in the pursuit of the taxpayer's
trade or business. The court added the additional qualification
based upon United States v. Correll,27 that all travel expenses
on trips that require neither sleep nor rest are not deduttible
pursuant to section 162(a)(2).lI8 Pursuant to the "sleep or rest"
ru1e, the taxpayers' overtime-related expenses for meals were
not justifiably deductible simply because they were required to
work overtime.29
The more pressing question for the court, however, was the
taxpayers' contention that when they slept overnight at the Test
Site due to the exigencies of their employers' business, they were
"away from home" pursuant to section 162(a)(2), and therefore
entitled to deduct related expenses. As a corollary to this argument, the taxpayers maintained that their "tax homes" were
their individual residences, or, in the alternative, their individual work stations at the Test Site, but not the entire Test Site. 3o
Reversing the conclusions of the Tax Court and district
court, which held that the taxpayers' "tax homes" included the
entire Test Site,31 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the location
of one's "tax home" is a question of fact for the purposes of section 162(a)(2).3l1 In this regard, regularly employed taxpayers
have as a "tax home" their abode at their principal place of bus25. Supra note 3.
26. 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).
27. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
28. 608 F.2d at 1274. The court also stated that it was irrelevant that the expenses
were incurred while traveling, unless the "sleep or rest" rule of United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299 (1967) was met.
29.ld.
30.ld.
31. ld.
32. ld. The court cited Frank v. United States, 557 F.2d 93, 97 (9th Cir. 1978),
which in turn cited Curtis v. Commissioner, 449 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1971), for the
proposition that except for a taxpayer who has only one abode, the location of that tax·
payer's "tax home" is a question of fact. While on first impression there appeared to be
confusion in the Ninth Circuit as to the location of a taxpayer's "tax home," the court
stated that there never was any such confusion.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 14

388 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.11:383

iness or employment.s3 Although it had previously held that a
taxpayer's principal place of business is his or her "home" for
tax purposes, the court did not mean it to be the address of the
taxpayer's business or that of his or her employer.s4 Therefore,
the court stated that it had never held the actual address of a
taxpayer's place of employment to be his or her tax home.3G
Rursuant to the rules announced in Commissioner v.
·Stidger,36 Smith v.. Warren,S7 and Sanders v. Commissioner,s8
the Commissioner and the Government claimed that the Ninth
Circuit should find that a "tax home" and place of business are
synonomous.S9 The court distinguished the cited cases on their
facts and refused to make such an extension. It found support in
Barnhill v. Commissioner,4o where that court stated that although the statute implies taxpayers' "homes" must be in the
same general locale as their place of employment, it does not
mean that the word "home" should be synonomous with the
term "place of busi;ness."41
33. 608 F.2d at 1274.
34. [d. at 1275. The court referred to its decision in Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d
537, 539 (9th Cir. 1969). It stated that in Wills, the professional baseball player's home
for tax purposes was Los Angeles, and not the Dodger ballpark. The court held that this
reasoning is "wholly consistent with our decision in Wright v. Hartsell, [305 F.2d 221,
225 (9th Cir. 1962)], where, although in a different situation, we stated that a taxpayer
may be expected to mitigate his expenses by living as near to his job site as is reasonably
possible." 608 F.2d 1275. Although United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967), and
Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971),
changed the law in this area, the court stated that "neither case modified our implicit
reaffirmation that a taxpayer's 'home' is his abode." 608 F.2d at 1274.
35. 608 F.2d at 1275.
36. 386 U.S. 287 (1967). 'l'he Stidger Court held that "insofar as military personnel
are concerned, their permanent duty stations are also their homes for the purposes of
determining the deductibility of travel expenses. The court explicitly refrained from
adopting any rule applicable to taxpayers generally." 608 F.2d at 1275 (citations
omitted).
37. 388 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). The court stated at 1275, that in
Smith it considered the deductibility of travel expenses pursuant to the general provisions of section 162(a), and the section 162(a)(2) travel expense provision was not at
issue.
38. 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). The Sanders court
concluded that any travel expense deduction under § 162(a)(2) was precluded by the
"sleep or rest" rule of United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
39. 608 F.2d at 1275.
40. 148 F.2d 913, 917 (4th Cir. 1945).
41. 608 F.2d at 1275. The court also stated that where a taxpayer accepts employment for an indefinite period of time away from his usual abode, that taxpayer's "tax
home" will shift to the new place of employment, because a decision to maintain the
former abode is one of personal choice and therefore the expenses are nondeductible
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The specific circumstances of the taxpayers in the instant
case led the Ninth Circuit to find that the Tax Court· and the
district court were in error when they found that the taxpayers'
"tax homes" were not their personal residences. Such error was
found because the taxpayers maintained their homes in Las
Vegas, the closest habitable community to the Test Site.42

.

Having determined the taxpayers' "tax homes" were their
personal residences in Las Vegas, the court accepted the taxpayers' claim that when they slept overnight at the Test Site, due to
the exigencies of their employers' business, they were "away
from home" within the meaning of section 162(a)(2).43 This conclusion was based upon the unique circumstances of the taxpayers. Because the taxpayers encountered an unavoidable distance
between their homes and jobs, when they found it necessary to
sleep overnight at the Test Site due to the requirement that
they perform overtime work, they were entitled to deduct the
costs of extra meals and lodging incurred under section
162(a)(2).44
J

However, because the Cox taxpayers failed to properly substantiate their expenses, the Ninth Circuit denied their claimed
deductions. The Coombs cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.415
personal expenses under § 262. ld. at 1275-76. See Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d
1249, 1253 (6th Cir. 1974).
42. 608 F.2d at 1276. However, pursuant to Sanders, the taxpayers were unable to
deduct their daily commuting expenses incurred between their homes and the Test Site
as travel expenses.
43. 608 F.2d at 1276. The court attempted to balance the equities between the taxpayers in the instant case and the average daily commuter, and in addition, to consider
the policy of § 162(a)(2) to take into account the extraordinary, often duplicative costs,
especially for lodging, that a taxpayer incurs in travel away from home in the pursuit of
business. The court cited United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 303-05; Brandl v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1975); Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206
(1st Cir. 1967); and James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1962).
44. 608 F.2d at 1276-77.
45. ld. at 1277-79. The district court determined that the Cox taxpayers failed to
substantiate their expenses pursuant to § 274(d). The Cox taxpayers claimed that the
district court erred when it failed to exempt them from the substantiation requirement
of § 274(d) pursuant to Rev. Ru!. 71-412, 1971-2 C.B. 170. The Ninth Circuit held that
the taxpayers received their allowances whether or not they were required to expend
such allowances for meals or lodging in the pursuit of their employers' business, and
thus, they failed to meet the requirements of Rev. Ru!. 71-412, and Treas. Reg. § 1.2745(f) (T.D. 7226, Dec. 15, 1972, 37 F.R. 26711). In its denial of a travel expense deduction

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 14

390

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:383

B. Folkman v. United States

Background
Folkman had as its companion case, Dehne v. United
States,f6 which was based upon similar circumstances. Both taxpayers were airline pilots employed by Pan American World Airways and stationed in San Francisco, California'" In order to
maintain their proficiency as pilots, they enlisted in the Nevada
Air National Guard Air Reserve Unit (the Guard) stationed in
Reno. As a condition of their empioyment, the Guard required
that all pilots live in Reno. Therefore, both taxpayers moved
their families to Reno and commuted to their Pan American
duty posts.
During the applicable tax years, both taxpayers worked
more days for Pan American, and derived considerably more income from Pan American than from the Guard.fs The taxpayers
to the Cox taxpayers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding on the basis
of the taxpayers' failure to properly substantiate their expenses.
The taxpayers in Cox and Coombs who were members of craft unions claimed that
because they were unable to make use of the free bus service while on the Test Site, they
were entitled to deduct their daily on-site transportation costs incurred between the
Camp Mercury Control Point and their forward work stations. The Ninth Circuit recognized that under Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1964), travel
expenses incurred by a taxpayer who must travel from one work site to another are generally deductible. However, beclluse the district court and the Tax Court concluded that
the Camp Mercury Control Point was an arbitrary middle point on the taxpayers' daily
commute to work, the only issue that the Ninth Circuit recognized in this regard was
whether Camp Mercury was such a middle point, or whether it could be considered the
taxpayers' office. The court agreed with the courts of the first instance in both cases that
the present facts were analogous to those in White v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 273
(1972), where, although the ta.xpayer had a substantial distance to commute, fifteen
miles of which was on his work site after entering the main gate, the court concluded
that he was not entitled to a deduction for the cost of travel on site. The Ninth Circuit
could not find that the lower courts' findings were clearly erroneous and affirmed the
denial of deductions to the craft union taxpayers for on-site travel expenses.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayers' contention that the Commissioner
discriminated against them when his Baltimore District Director issued a private "letter
ruling" to the federal employees on the Test Site. The ruling simply set forth general
rules for withholding taxes on per diem allowances, including such allowances in income,
and therefore the lower courts did not err in rejecting the discrimination claims.
46. 615 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1980).
47. ld. at 494. Although both taxpayers were initially stationed in San Francisco,
Dehne was transferred to Kennedy Airport in New York City. During the relevant tax
years, Dehne traveled between his Pan American duty post at Kennedy Airport, and his
family residence in Reno.
48. ld. at 494.
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claimed deductions 49 for the cost of travel between Reno and
their airline duty posts. ISO All the deductions were disallowed,
and the Commissioner assessed additional taxes for the resultant
deficiencies.
Deciding both cases together, the district court found that
the taxpayers' "tax homes" were in Reno and not at their Pan
American duty posts as the Government had contended. 51 Based
upon this finding, the district court found that the costs incurred by the taxpayers in travel between Reno and their respective airline duty posts were travel expenses incurred while
"away from home" and deductible pursuant to section
162(a)(2).1S2 The court also allowed as a deduction the cost of
meals and lodging incurred by the taxpayers at their respective
airline duty posts.1S3

Two Jobs: Tax Home at "Abode" at Principal Duty Post
Unlike in Coombs, the Folkman court focused only on section 162(a)(2) travel expense deductions. In reversing the district court which had held that the taxpayers' "tax homes" were
in Reno and not at their airline duty posts,1S4 the court referred
to its earlier decision in Coombs. Based upon the Coombs holding that a "tax home" is a personal residence at the principal
place of employment,ISIS the court had to determine which of the
taxpayers' two places of employment was their "principal place
of employment."
In an effort to resolve what it believed to be a difficult question, the court adopted the objective three-part definitional approach proposed by the Government156 and adopted by the Sixth
49. The applicable tax years were 1971 and 1972.
50. Folkman also claimed deductions for the cost of meals when he served with the
Guard. Dehne claimed deductions for food and lodging expenses incurred at his Pan
American duty post in New York.
5!. Folkman v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (D. Nev. 1977).
52.ld.
53. ld. at 1030.
54. 615 F.2d at 496, reu'g, 433 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Nev. 1977).
55. 608 F.2d at 1275.
56. Rev. RuI. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51, 52. In an announcement on § 162(a)(2)'s predecessor, I.R.C. of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(1)(A), 53 Stat. ch. 2, the Government stated factors
to be considered in cases where "baseball players. managers, coaches, or trainers also
engage in another trade or business during the taxable year."
The more important factors to be considered in making a fac-
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Circuit in Markey v. Commissioner.1I7 The test, as adopted by
the court in Folkman, provides the following factors for consideration to determine the principal place of employment: (1) the
length of time the taxpayer spent in each location; (2) the taxpayer's degree of business activity at each location; and (3) the
financial return to the taxpayer with respect to each 10cation.IIB
After applying this test to the taxpayers in Folkman, the
court determined that their principal places of business were
their respective airline duty posts.1I9 Although the taxpayers
spent most of their time in Reno, where they maintained their
family residences, they derived significantly more of their in. come from their Pan .American jobs. They also devoted the vast
majority of their working time to their airlille jobs.sO Because the
taxpayers' principal place of employment was at their airline
duty posts, their "homes" for tax purposes were their personal
residences at their respective duty posts.S1
For the remainder of its opinion, the court focused upon the
"away from home" aspect of section 162(a)(2).s2 The Ninth Circuit determined that even though the taxpayers maintained
family residences in Reno, they did so for business reasons.ss
tual determination regarding the location of a taxpayer's principal place of busineess or tax "home" are the ordinary time
spent by the taxpayer at each of his business posts, the degree
of business activity at each such post, and whether the
financial return in respect of each post is significant or insignificant. No one factor is determinative, although the point
last mentioned should be given great weight where all services
are performed as an "employee"•.•.
57. 490 F.2d 1249, 1252 & 1255 (6th Cir. 1974).
58. 615 F.2d at 496.
59.Id.
60.Id.
61. Id. The court gave accord to Frank v. United States, 577 F.2d 93, 97 (9th Cir.
1978) (the location of one's "home" for tax purposes is a question of fact), and Wills v.
Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1969) (the determination of one's "tax
home" essentially involves the resolution of a question of fact).
62. I.R.C. § 162 provides in pertinent part:
(a) in general-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including(2) traveling expenses • . • while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business • . • .
63. 615 F.2d at 497.
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Even though the Guard had imposed a residency requirement on
all pilots, the court held that the travel expenses incurred when
the taxpayers served with the Guard would have been deductible
anyway. M Because the taxpayers' family residences were located
in Reno for sound business reasons and not because of personal
fancy,615 the taxpayers were allowed to deduct the related travel
expenditures that were ordinarily and necessarily incurred in the
pursuit of business.66
The• Ninth Circuit vacated the judgments of the district
court and remanded the cases for entry of modified judgments.
The modified judgments were to be based upon a determination
by the district court of the number-of trips the taxpayers made
to Reno that included guard duty.61
C. Sibla v. Commissioner

Background

Both taxpayers, Sibla68 and Cooper,69 were employed by the
Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) for the. taxable years in
question. The taxpayers normally worked twenty-four hour
shifts and were not permitted to leave the fire station on per64. [d. Under Rev. RuL 54-147, supra note 56, "taxpayers may deduct [their] travel
expenses mcurred in discharging their duties at the city which is removed from the principal place of business." Note, however, the Folkman panel considered the taxpayers'
residency requirement as analogous to a valid business purpose. Ct. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1706 (1976) (absence of a residency requirement supported a personal
motive for taxpayer's change of residence).
65. 615 F.2d at 497.
66. [d. at 498.
67. [d.
68. Richard R. Sibla filed a joint federal income tax return with his wife for the
calendar year 1973, and he appeared pro se in the Tax Court and in the Ninth Circuit.
In another action, Sibla appealed his conviction on two counts of willful failure to
file an income tax return, in violation of I.R.C. § 7203. The sole issue on appeal was
whether the district judge committed reversible error in denying Sibla's motion for
recusal of the judge. Sibla contended that because the judge admonished him during a
discovery motion at a pretrial hearing where he made a "frivolous legal argument con- ,
cerning the validity of the federal tax scheme," demonstrated prejudice. Sibla's motion
and accompanying affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976), that the judge recus
himself was denied in the district court on the ground that the affidavit was insufficient
on its face because it did not state sufficient grounds for recusal. On. appeal, the Ninth
Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the decision of the district court. United
States v. Sibla, No. 78-1724 (9th Cir. March 3, 1980).
69. Robert E. Cooper filed an individ~ federal income tax return for 1972 and
1973, the taxable years in issue.
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sonal business while 011 duty. Unless officially excused by the
Fire Commissioner,70 all firefighters were required to participate
in a "nonexclusionary organized mess" at the station house .
. LAFD provided the kitchen facilities. The firemen, however,
generally organized the activities, provided the utensils, purchased and prepared the food, and collected the money.71 All
employees were required to pay the mess fee even though they
might be away from the station house on LAFD businesl' during
the mess period.
In 1973, Sibla deducted his total payments into the plan for
the year.72 Cooper deducted his payments for both 1972 and
1973. Both taxpayers (:laimed the deductions as "ordinary and
necessary business expenses" pursuant to section 162(a). The
Commissioner disallowed the expenses as nondeductible personal expenses.
Both courts of the first instance found that the taxpayers'
mess expenses qualified as "ordinary and necessary business expenses," and held they were deductible under section 162(a).78 A
concurring opinion in the Tax Court in Cooper would have allowed an exclusion of the amount paid into the mess plan under
section 119, and disallowed it as a deduction from income pursuant to section 162(a).7'J
70. The only recognized ground for excusal was a physical ailment verified by the
city's own examining physician.
71. The meals averaged $3.00 per person, per 24 hour shift.
72. Other issues that concerned Sibla and his 1973 federal income tax return were
decided by the Tax Court and are not relevant to this Note: (1) in computing his income
subject to tax, Sibla was unable to exclude or deduct amounts withheld from his salary
during 1973, as contributions into the LAFD pension fund, 68 T.C. at 427-30; (2) Sibla
was not "entitled to any adjustment in gross income he received because of any decline
in the value of the dollar with respect to gold or silver," Id. at 431; (3) Sibla was not
entitled to a dependency exemption for a 21-year-old son who did not receiver over half
of his support from him, 68 T.C. at 431; and (4) Sibla was entitled to deduct "ordinary
and necessary" expenses of his rental business, 68 T.C. at 432-33.
73. Cooper v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 870, 872-74 (1977); Sibla v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 422, 431-32 (1977).
74. 67 T.C. 870, 874-76 (Simpson, J., concurring). Judge Simpson, in a concurring
opinion subscribed to by Dawson, Scott, Tannenwald, Featherson, and Wilbur, J.J.,
agreed with the conclusion of the majority, in that the taxpayers should not be taxed
upon the amounts paid into the mess plan. These judges, however, felt that § 119, provided a stronger basis to avoid tax liability on the part of the taxpayer. Believing that
the cost of meals are personal expenditures under § 262, wherein no deduction is allowed
for such expenditures unless expressly provided for by statute, the concurring judges
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Restrictive Employment Condition Leads To Deduction And
Exclusion
The Ninth Circuit initially addressed the taxpayers' claim
to a business expense deduction of the "mess fee" under section
162(a).'115 Section 162(a) provides for a "deduction [of] all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . ."'16 The court
compared section 162 to section 262, which disallows deductions
for personal expenses not otherwise provided for by statute.'1'1
Following the stance of Judge Fay's majority opinion in the
Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that personal expenses
can, when required under certain circumstances by company
regulations, lose their personal character and become more akin
to business expenses. '18 The court recognized the unusual nature
of the taxpayers' employment, the involuntary nature of their
mess expenses, and their limited ability to participate in the
mess. '19 These factors, combined with their employer's lack of
compensatory intent in enacting the mess requirement, provided
the basis for the court to affirm the Tax Court's findings that
the amounts in issue were business rather than personal
expenses. 80
stated that to allow such a deduction under § 162{a) would create confusion in the courts
on the issue of personal expenditures. See note 77 infra for the full.text of I.R.C. § 262.
75. 611 F.2d at 1262.
76. I.R.C. § 162{a). For the text of the section, see note 3 supra.
77. 611 F.2d at 1262. I.R.C. § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
78. 611 F.2d at 1262. The court quoted Judge Fay's opinion for the majority in the
Tax Court, which in turn quoted Rev. Rul. 75-316, 1975-2 C.B. 54, and referred to Robert J. Kowalski, 65 T.C. 44, 63 (Drennen, J., concurring and dissenting), re/J'd sub nom.
Kowalski v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1976). Subsequent to the Tax Court's
decision in Coombs, but prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sibla, the Supreme
Court reversed the Third Circuit decision in Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77
(1977).
79. 611 F.2d at 1261. At times, the taxpayers were called away on LAFD business
during the mess period, but they were still required to pay for such mess period.
80. 611 F.2d at 1262. In its reluctance to modify the Tax Court's factual findings,
the court cited Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943):
Whether an expenditure is directly related to a business and
whether it is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure questions of fact in most instances. Except where a question of law
is unmistakably involved a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals on these issues, having taken into account the presumption supporting the Commissioner's ruling should not be reversed by the federal appellate courts. Careful adherence to
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The dissenting judges in the Tax COurt81 stated that the allowance of a deduction for the mess fees under section 162(a)
would create confusion, and exacerbate the task of rationally
distinguishing between personal and business expenses and
therefore, such a deduction should not be allowed under section
162(a).82 While acknowledging this concern, however, the Ninth
Circuit believed that it could not justify an abdication of its difficult duty to determine the Congressional intent of section
162(a).88
In an effort to justify its allowance of a business deduction
based upon the unique situation of the taxpayers, the court addressed the Commissioner's arguments. On the authority of
Steiner v. United States, M the Commissioner claimed that mess
fee expenses were "personal" rather than "business" in character, and that the taxlPayers would have incurred a similar expense for meals whether they ate at work or not.85 Therefore,
they should be nondeductible personal expenses. In distinguishing Steiner on its facts, the court affirmed the Tax Court's finding that the taxpayers' situation was both "unique" and "unusual," and that the amounts in issue were business expenses.88
To support its analysis, the court cited Pevsner v. Commissioner.87 In Pevsner the Tax Court allowed a deduction for
clothing that a taxpayer was required to wear for her job, even
for ordinary wear in certain
though the clothing was suitable
-

.

this principal will result in a more orderly and uniform system
of tax deductions hi a field necessarily beset by innumerable
complexities.
81. 611 F.2d at 1263 (footnotes omitted). Judge Simpson (joined by Dawson, Scott,
Tannenwald, Featherson, and Wilbur, J.J.) concurred in the result of the Tax Court, but
did so on the ground that the fees 8hould be excludable from income under section 119,
and not deductible under § 1.62(a). See note 74 supra.
82. In his concurring opinion in Cooper, 67 T.C. 870, 876 (1977), Judge Simpson
expressed his fear that "[ilf a deduction is allowed under § 612(a) for this personal expenditure, we may be launched down a slippery slope, and it may be difficult to find a
ratiQnal basis for drawing a line in other cases involving personal expenditures." See note
74 supra.
83. 611 F.2d at 1263.
84. 524 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1975). In Stiner, the court refused to allow a deduction
for the cost of a uniform where the clothing was suitable for ordinary wear.
85. 611 F.2d at 1262.
86. Id. at 1263.
87. Pevsner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 1210 (1979). The taxpayer was required to
buy and wear high fashion clothes for use in her job, and even though such clothing was
suitable for ordinary wear in certain lifestyles, the taxpayer did not pursue such a
lifestyle.
<
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lifestyles.
Under the authority of James v. United States,88 and
Laforge v. Commissioner,89 the Commissioner also argued that
the cost of the taxpayers' meals was a personal expense and
therefore not deductible pursuant to section 162(a). Because
both James and Laforge were so dissimilar from the facts
presented .in the instant situation, the court held that neither
was persuasive. 90 The court also refused to entertain any argument that the taxpayers fell within the purview of two recent
Tax Court Memorandum decisions.91 Neither taxpayer in each
of those decisions faced mandatory requirements of their employer as did the taxpayers in this case,92 and as a result, neither
decision was dispositive of the taxpayers' unique situation.98

In its analysis of the taxpayers' claims to meal exclusions
under section 119, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the concurring
opinion in Cooper in the Tax Court on this issue, and that
court's summary of Treasury Regulation section 1.119-1(a)(3).94
88. 308 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962). James involved § 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 I.R.C.,
and concerned a claim based upon the sole issue of the location of a taxpayer's home.
89. 434 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1970). Laforge was based upon the substantiation of entertainment expenses and whether the Tax Court correctly computed the portion of
country club dues which were deductible as entertainment expenses.
90. 611 F.2d at 1263. See notes 88 & 89 supra.
91. John M. Murphy, 34 T.C.M. 1377 (1975), and Gregory J. Moscini, '36 T.C.M.
1002 (1975). In Murphy, the taxpayer, a fireman, was free to eat his own food and was
not required to pay into a mandatory mess program. It was unclear whether the court
was discussing "deductions" under § 162(a), or the exclusion of the value of the meals
furnished for the convenienc.e of the employer under § 119. Moscini dealt with a policeman who was not required to purchase meals as a condition of his employment, and the
court found no evidence that the taxpayer was ever required to purchase a meal which
he did not eat because of his police duties.
92. 611 F.2d at 1263-64. See note 91 supra.
93.ld.
94. 611 F.2d 1264. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the conclusion of the concurring
opinion in the Tax Court in Cooper. This concurrence was based upon Treas. Reg. §
1.119-1(a)(2) (1964) which provides:
(ii)(a) Meals will be regarded as furnished for a substantial
noncompensatory business reason of the employer when the
meals are furnished to the employee during his working hours
to have the employee available for emergency call during his
meal period. In order to demonstrate that meals are furnished
to the employee to have the employee available for emergency
call during the meal period, it must be shown that emergencies have actually occurred, or can reasonably be expected to
occur, in the employer's business which have resulted, or will
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Under section 1.119-1(a)(3), employees are not taxable on
amounts charged for meals if the following conditions are met:
(1) The meals are furnished by and for the convenience of the
employer; (2) there is a charge for the meals equal to their value;
and (3) the charge must be paid whether the employee chooses
to eat the meals or not and irrespective of how much he eats.95
Even though the employer did not directly purchase the
. food, supervise the preparation of the meals, or withhold the
charge from the taxpayers' compensation, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the concurring judges in the Tax COurt,96 who stated
that in substance, the situation in the instant case was indistinguishable from the typical situation where the employer directs
the preparation of the meals.97 The majority in the Tax Court,
however, found that the meals were not in· fact furnished "in
kind" by the employer, and the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to
criticize that finding because of the ample evidence to support
it.9s Even so, relying on the record, which was admittedly
"sketchy,"99 the Ninth Circuit stated that a "strong argument
result, in the employer calling on the employee to perform his
job during his meal period;
and § 1.119-1(a)(3) (1964), which provides:
(i) If an employer provides meals which an employee mayor
may not purchase, the meals will not be regarded as furnished
for the convenience of the employer. Thus, meals for which a
charge is made by the employer will not be regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employer if the employee
has a choice of accepting the meals and paying for them or of
not paying for them and providing his meals in another
manner.
.
(ii) If an employer furnishes an employee meals for which the
employee is charged an unvarying amount (for example, by
subtraction from his stated compensation) irrespective of
whether he accepts the meals, the amount of such flat charge
made by the employer for such meals is not, as such, part of
the compensation includable in the gross income of the employee . . . .
95. 611 F.2d at 1264.
96.· [d. at 1264. The court quoted Judge Simpson's concurrence at 67 T.e. 870, 876
(1977): "There can be no question but that if the meals were furnished in kind, they
would qualify for the exclusion." See also note 74 supra.
97. 611 F.2d at 1265. The majority in the Tax Court found that the expenses in
question were "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 162(a). 67 T.C. at
870-74 (1977).
98. 611 F.2d at 1265.
99. [d. at 1264. The record was "sketchy," in a sense, as to what extent the LAFD
actually supervised the preparation of the meals, and the collection of the money. See id.
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could have been made that the meals were in fact 'furnished in
kind by the employer.' "l00 As such, the slim distinction between
the Tax Court's findings and this argument was "too slender a
reed" upon which the Ninth Circuit would hang tax liability.101
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Kowalski,102 held
that cash meal allowances are not excludable from income under
section 119. On this authority, the Commissioner argued that
the taxpaye:t:s' meal payments are includable in income. In Kowalski, the taxpayer was given a cash "meal" allowance over
which he had complete dominion. 1oa In the instant case, the taxpayers were required to participate in the meal plan at the station house and pay for those meals whether they ate them or
not. 10' Because of the distinction between the taxpayers in the
instant case and the taxpayer in Kowalski, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the Commissioner's argument, and distinguished
Kowalski on its facts. 1011
Even though a factual distinction existed, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the problem presented by Kowalski, in that the Supreme Court would allow deductions for meals "furnished by the
employer in kind" but would disallow deductions for "cash advances for food. "106 Stating that the Supreme Court's concept of
"cash allowances" assumes that the taxpayer has complete dominion over his allowance,l°7 the court said: "In light of all the
circumstances in this case, the meals in question ·in a very real
at 1264-65 nn.1 & 2.
100. ld. at 1264. Although the Ninth Circuit believed the evidence was ample to
support the Tax Court's findings, it stated that a strong argument could have been made
to show that the meals were "furnished in kind by the employer" to illuminate the faint
line between the two concepts.
101.ld.
102. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
103. The taxpayers in Kowalski were New Jersey State Troopers who were given a
cash meal allowance that they could spend in any manner they wished. In fact, they were
not required to spend it all. The meal allowance was paid whether the taxpayer was on
duty, sick leave, or vacation, and regardless of whether he brought his own lunch or ate
at home. In addition, the allowance varied with the taxpayer's rank, and the allowance
was described in the recruiting brochure as being in addition to the taxpayer's regular
salary.
104. 611 F.2d at 1265.
105.ld.
l06.ld.
107. The court would not believe the Supreme Court would disallow an otherwise
excludable allowance simply because cash was used to implement the employer's plan.
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sense were 'furnished in kind by the employer' upon the 'business property' by means conceived and established by the employer for its convenience." This being so, the court held the
taxpay~rs should be permitted to exclude from their gross income, pursuant to section 119, the value of these meals even
though cash has been used as a simple method to implement the
plan. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayers may
choose to either exclude the amounts paid for mess fees under
section 119, or deduct them from gross income pursuant to section 162(a).108
Judge Kennedy dissented,I09 stating that the taxpayers were
entitled neither to a deduction under section 162(a) nor an exclusion pursuant to section 119.110 Because the Tax Court in
Cooper, upon which the majority relied, handed down only a
plurality decision, he believed that the Ninth Circuit was not
hound to give the findings of that tribunal decisive weight. In
addition, because Cooper preceded the Supreme Court's opinion
in Kowalski, wherein that Court narrowly interpreted section
119, Judge Kennedy felt that the Tax Court's decision in Cooper
should have been reversed on authority of Kowalski. 111 He felt
that this could have heen done without an overly literal reading
of section 119.112
()

Because the restriction on the taxpayers' consumption preferences was not great enough to limit their personal taste, Judge
Kennedy stated that it is an "occasion for an accession to
wealth" over which the taxpayer does not give up "complete dominion."l1s In this regard, he argued that the taxpayers did not
give up enough control over their allowances to qualify for the
exclusion. Because s,ections 162 and 119 are legislative exceptions to the generally broad taxing powers of Congress, they
~hould not be judicially broadened beyond their explicit
terms.114
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

611 F.2d at 1265-66.
[d. at 1266 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955».
[d. (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940».
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ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING.

In these three cases, the Ninth Circuit dealt with taxpayers
whose jobs required certain employment-related expenditures
not common to normally employed taxpayers. It seems apparent
that under certain restrictive circumstances, the court would be
willing to provide taxpayers relief that the tax law in its strictest
interpretation would fail to provide. Seemingly, the more restrictive or burdensome the taxpayer's job-related expenditure, the
more willing the Ninth Circuit is to mitigate his or her tax
liability.
One's Tax Home Is One's Personal Residence or Abode.

The Ninth Circuit has firmly established that one's "tax
home" is one's personal residence or abode in, or as near to as is
reasonably possible, the locale of one's principal place of employment. This rule reaffirms the Ninth Circuit's traditional position which has historically been at variance with that of the
Commissioner and the Tax Court. Since the inception of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1115 the Commissioner116 and the
Tax Courtl l'1 have consistently embraced the view that one's
"tax home" is one's principal place of business or employment.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed its "tax home" rule in Coombs
and Folkman. Taxpayers in Coombs encountered the more burdensome employment-related expenditures. Thus in Coombs,
the particular taxpayers' situation may have provided the court
. an additional impetus to conclude that their "tax homes" were
115. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I, § 23(a)(1)(A), 53 Stat. ch. 2 (now I.R.C. §
162(a) (2».
116. Rev. RuI. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60, 61 provides that it is "the long established
position of the Internal Revenue Service that the 'home' referred to in § 162(a) (2) of the
code as the place from which traveling expenses must be incurred to be deductible is, as
a general rule the place at which the taxpayer conducts the trade or business." This is
the basic position also announced in Rev. RuI. 60·189, 1960-1 C.B. 60, 61, and Rev. RuI.
54,497, 1954·2 C.B. 75, 77.
117. In Morgan v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 1263 (1979), the taxpayer's "tax home"
was held to be his place of employment even though he maintained a family residence
elsewhere. The Tax Court in Bowman v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 381, 385 (1979),
stated that "[b]ome for the purposes of section 162(a)(2) means the taxpayer's principal
place of business." In Bixler v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927), the then
Board of Tax Appeals made its first ruling on the "tax home" issue, stating that "a
taxpayer may not keep his residence at a point where he is not engaged in carrying on a
trade or business ••••"
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their personal residences. lls Folkman, decided shortly thereaf118. A number of factors may have influenced the court and provided a strong basis
for its decision. The policy of § 162(a)(2) "to take account of the extraordinary, often
duplicative costs, especially for lodging, incurred while traveling away from home," is a
paramount factor. See note 43 supra. Under the Commissioner's rule, the taxpayers
would not have been away from home when they slept overnight at the Test Site. However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the taxpayers still had to maintain personal residences while incurring the additional burden of travel expenses related to overtime work.
608 F.2d at 1267-77. In this light, the court's holding that the "tax homes" were the
taxpayers' personal residences advanced the policy of § 162(a)(2), while at the same time
avoided an inequitable result for the taxpayers.
Although not explicitly stated in its opinion, another factor which may have influenced the court's decision is that both the Commissioner and the Government respectively, took inconsistent positions on the location of the taxpayers' "tax homes." For the
purposes of disallowing "away from home" travel expense deductions, both parties maintained the taxpayers' "tax homes" were at the Test Site, but for the purposes of disallowing transportation/commuting expenses, they claimed that the taxpayers' personal
residences were in Las Vegas, Nevada. See notes 15 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
Under the Commissioner's and the Government's treatment of the personal residences, the taxpayers were unable to deduct their transportation expenses incurred between their homes and job sites because they were personal commuting expenses. Commuting expenses incurred by an individual between his or her personal residence and
normal place of employment are generally considered to be nonductible personal expenses. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e) (1960), 1.212-1(f) (T.D. 7345, Feb. 20, 1975, 40 F.R.
7439), & 1.262-1(b)(5) (T.D. 7207, Oct. 4, 1972, 37 F.R. 20795); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2
C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 59: Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973);
Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
However, because both parties maintained that the taxpayers' "tax homes" were located on the Test Site, or in the alternative, that they included both the'Test Site and
the taxpayers' residences, the taxpayers were unable to deduct the related expenses since
they were not "away from home" when they stayed overnight at the Test Site according
to the test in Flowers.
The Ninth Circuit refllEed to place the taxpayers in such a "no-win" situation. Its
definition of "tax home" as the personal residence or abode of the taxpayer prevented
the Commissioner and the Government from taking such inconsistent positions in the
future through the use of the "tax home" doctrine.
Finally, as the Second Circuit aptly pointed out in Rosenspan v. United States, 438
F.2d 905, 910-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971), the Commissioner's position
that one's "tax home" is at his or her principal place of business, is not necessary to
protect the revenue gathering statutes. "That purpose is served, without any such distortion of [the term "tax home"], by the third condition laid down in Flowers, supra, 326
U.S. at 470 ..., namely, 'that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer' and
that 'such an expenditure must necessary or appropriate to the development and pursuit
of the business or trade.''' 438 F.2d at 911.
In Rosenspan, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether a traveling salesman has as his "tax home" his employer's principal place of business. It is interesting to
note that the Commissioner asserted an exception to its rule, in that a taxpayer who had
no home did not have as his or her "tax home" the address of his or her employer's
principal place of business. The Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument
and held that a taxpayer who had no home could not be "away from home" pursuant to
§ 162(a)(2).
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ter, followed the Coombs "tax home" rule in the context of taxpayers with two places of employment. In Folkman, the taxpayers' employment-related expenditures were not as burdensome
as those incurred by the taxpayers in Coombs,119 and the court's
focus was upon the determination of one's principal place of
business.
Historical Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's "Tax Home" Rule

The Ninth Circuit has often addressed the "tax home" location issue, and has had ample opportunity to hold that one's
"tax home" and place of business are synonomous. Although
there was some implication, stemming from Smith v. Warren 120
and Wills v. Commissioner,121 that the court might acquiesce to
the Commissioner's "tax home" view, it has never retreated from
its traditional rule. 122
In determining its definition of one's "tax home," the Ninth
Circuit was never governed by any precedent in the Supreme
Court, which failed to define the term as it appears in section
162{a){2).123 When the Ninth Circuit- addressed the "tax home"
Because the purpose of the revenue gathering statutes can be met through use of the
third condition of the Flowers test, the Commissioner's general rule that one's "tax
home" is one's principal place of business is redundant, and at times, as in Coombs,
causes inequitable results without any furtherance of the policy of § 162(a)(2).
119. In Folkman, the taxpayer's principal places of duty were found to be in New
York and San Francisco, respectively. 615 F.2d at 496. Because Coombs requires that
one's "tax home" be one's personal abode in the locale of their principal place of business, and the taxpayers stayed at hotels when at their principal duty post, 615 F.2d at
495 n.7, the taxpayers' "tax homes"- would be their hotel locations. In this regard, the
taxpayers did not have to bear the duplicative costs of lodging when they traveled away
from their "tax homes."
120. 388 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1968). See notes 128, 129 & 132 infra and accompanying
text.
121. 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969). See notes 130-132 infra and accompanying text.
122. Beginning with Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944), the
Ninth Circuit has interpreted "tax home" to mean personal residence of abode. In Wallace, the court held that a "home" in relation to a place of abode is the dwelling place of
a person. The court in James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962), stated that
"home" refers to residence and not one's principal place of business. In Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962), the court found that the taxpayer's inability to live
near his job site was a valid ground for a travel expense deduction. In Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960), the court held that a taxpayer's "tax home" was
his home, despite the fact that the taxpayer was transferred to another location because
of his job.
123. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946) rev'g 148 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.
1945), provided a three part test which must be met for a travel expense deduction
under the applicable predecessor to § 162(a)(2):

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 14

404

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l1:383

issue in Wright v. Hartsell/ 24 a case factually similar to Coombs,
it held that the taxpayers' inability to live near his job site was a
valid ground for a travel expense deduction. Although Hartsell
was later modified by United States v. Correll 125 and Sanders v.
Commissioner,126 its rule on the "tax home" issue remained
unaffected. 127
(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling expense, as that term is generally understood. This includes such items as transportation fares and food and lodging
expenses incurred while traveling;
(2) The expense must be incurred while away from home;
and
(3) The expense must be incurred in the pursuit of business. This means that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the taxpayer's
trade or business or that of his employer. Moreover, such an
expenditure must be necessary or appropriate to the development and pursuit of the business or trade.
The Court refused to defme whether the taxpayer's "tax home" was his abode or
place of business, because the Court determined that the expenses in issue were not
incurred in the pursuit of business. 326 U.S. at 471.
In Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) aff'g 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957),
the Court found that only temporary employment was at issue where the taxpayers held
construction jobs in another city. Therefore, it made no finding on the location of one's
"tax home."
Finally, in Stidger v. Commissioner, 386 U.S. 287 (1967) rev'g 355 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.
1965), the Court failed in its third opportunity to define the term "tax home." Here the
Court held that the permanent duty post of a military man in Japan was his "tax home"
and not his family home in California. However, the Court expressly declined to extend
this rule to taxpayers generally. See Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 910-12
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
124. 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962). In Hartsell, the taxpayer was faced with a situation where the nearest habitable location was 46 miles from his place of employment.
The Ninth Circuit held that "a taxpayer's inability to live near the jobsite [was] a valid
ground for deduction as a travel expense of the resulting cost of his transportation, food,
and lodging." Id. at 225. The court did not hold that the taxpayer's "tax home" was at
his place of employment.
125. 389 U.S. 299 (1967). See infra note 127.
126. 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). See note 127 infra.
127. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967), and Sanders v. Commissioner,
439 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 404 U.S. 864 (1974), substantially modified Hartsell in
terms of the "sleep or rest" rule, and commuting expense deductions, respectively. In
fact, Sanders has been viewed by commentators as overruling Hartsell. [1979] TAX
MNGM'T (BNA) No. 400 at A-8. However, the Sanders Court based its holding upon
commuting expenses, and made no determination on the issue of one's "tax home."
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to accept the Commissioner's
definition of "tax home," it did not do so.
See also, Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960); Crowther v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959).
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In Smith v. Warren/ 28 the Ninth Circuit disallowed a ship
pilot's claim to a deduction for transportation expenses incurred
in travel between his home, which he claimed was his business
office, and his job assignments. This decision implied that the
court might acquiesce to the Commissioner's view. As one commentator suggested, the court's disallowance of the taxpayer's
claim stood for the proposition that his "tax home" was the entire port area from which he piloted ships.129 Wills v. Commissioner/so decided a year later, could easily have added to the
implication of acquiescence. Support for the implication in Wills
would be based upon the Ninth Circuit's holding that a professional baseball player's "tax home" was in Los Angeles where he
was principally employed, even though he maintained his personal residence in Spokane, Washington.
However, although one could glean an inference of acquiescence from Smith and Wills, the cases, if examined closely, do
not deviate from the Ninth Circuit's traditional position. In
Smith, the court's disallowance of the taxpayer's claim was
based upon section 162(a) business expense deductions and not
section 162(a)(2) travel expenses. l3l Therefore, no decision on
the location of the taxpayer's "tax home" was made. In Wills,
the Ninth Circuit held the taxpayer's "tax home" was in Los
Angeles and not at Dodger Stadium, his principal place of employment.1s2 In this vein, Wills' "tax home" would be his personal abode in Los Angeles.
In continuing with its traditional position, the court held
more recently in Frank v. United States,133 that the location of
one's "tax home" is a question of fact. The court did not apply
the rule advanced by the Commissioner that one's "tax home" is
one's principal place of business or employment.
If any question remained after the Frank decision that the
Ninth Circuit's "tax home" doctrine was in a state of conflict,
Coombs reaffirmed the traditional position. In Coombs, the court
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

388 F.2d 671 (9th eir. 1968).
See [1979] TAX MNGM'T (BNA) No. 400 at A-B.
411 F.2d 537 (9th eir. 1969).
388 F.2d at 672.
411 F.2d at 540.
577 F.2d 93, 97 (9th eir. 1978).
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specifically held "when 'a regularly employed taxpayer maintains
his personal residence or abode within the general area of his
employment or as close thereto as is reasonably possible . . . his
"tax home" is that personal residence or abode."13'
It should be notE~d, however, that Coombs requires a taxpayer to live in, or as close as is reasonably possible, to his or her
place of employment morder to mitigate the travel expenses incurred. 135 The fact that the Coombs taxpayers' "tax homes" were
held to be in Reno, sixty-five miles away from the general locale
of their jobs, appears to be based upon the restrictive nature of
their jobs and their inability to live nearer their job sites. ls6 In
the absence of employment-related restrictions such as in
Coombs, a normally employed taxpayer's decision to live outside
the general area of his or her employment should be considered
to be one of personal choice.137 Coupled with the mitigation requirement of Coombs, the taxpayer's "tax home" should still be
considered to be in the general locale of his or her principal
place of employment, even though the taxpayer maintains no
"abode" in such location.

Folkman, the Ninth Circuit's most recent decision on the
"tax home" issue, buttressed the Coombs rule that one's "tax
home" is one's personal residence or abode. However, prior to
the court's application of its "tax home" rule in Folkman 138 it
134. 608 F.2d at 1275.
135. [d.
136. See note 118 suprcl.
137. Pursuant to § 262, personal expenditures are nondeductible unless provided for
specifically by statute. In Coombs, the Ninth Circuit recognized this provision of § 262 at
608 F.2d at 1276. See note '17 supra for the full text of I.R.C. § 262.
138. Although the Folkman court set out the Coombs "tax home" rule prior to its
determination of the taxpayer's principal place of business, 615 F.2d at 495, in order to
actually apply the rule it first had to determine the principal place of business.
Because the Ninth Circuit and the district court found that the taxpayers' "tax
homes" were at their principal place of employment and not at their personal residences,
the Ninth Circuit was forced to readdress the deductibility of travel expenses in this new
conwxt. See 433 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (D. Nev. 1977); 615 F.2d at 496. In this regard, the
Government contended that the taxpayers' travel expenses incurred between their "tax
homes" and their personal residences in Reno were nondeductible personal expenses.
Note 77 supra.
The underlying premise of this argunIent is that the taxpayers traveled to Reno
primarily to visit their families and not to pursue their employment with the Guard. Had
this argument any merit, the Ninth Circuit's allowance of a deduction for travel expenses
would have been erroneous, even though the taxpayers actually performed Guard duty
for the times they claimed deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(l) (1960) provides:
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had to determine which of two possible places was the taxpayIf a taxpayer travels to a destination and while at such destination engages in both business and personal activities, traveling expenses to and from such destination are deductible only
if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business. If the trip is personal iIi nature, the traveling expenses
are not deductible even though the taxpayer engages in business activities while at such destination. (Emphasis added.)
See Matteson v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1975); Mazzotta v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 427 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1972); Green v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 764 (1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1962); Alexander v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 410 (1979). These cases stand for the proposition that if a taxpayer is
unable to demonstrate a primary business purpose for traveling to the city where he
maintains his personal residence, the expenses incurred are considered nondeductible
personal expenses.
However, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (1960), whether a trip is made
primarily for personal or business motives is a question of fact to be determined by a
consideration of all the circumstances. Considering all the facts, the district court found
the taxpayers moved to Reno primarily for the purpose of serving with the Guard. 433 F.
Supp. at 1029. This finding was sufficiently supported by fact and adopted by the Ninth
Circuit. 615 F.2d at 494. Accordingly, the court's allowance of a deduction for the taxpayers' travel expenses incurred between their primary and secondary places of employment is consistent with the Government's interpretation of § 162(a)(2). Treas. Reg. §
1.l62-2(b)(1) (1960). The fact that the taxpayers also maintained personal residences at
the minor employment was of little importance.
One aspect of the court's opinion that raises concern is its suggestion that the taxpayers "could, consistent with its determination of their 'tax homes,' claim deductions
for substantiated overnight expenses incurred in Reno on days which they served with
the Guard"; 615 F.2d at 498 n.14. This statement, although dictum, does not appear to
be within the general consensus of the law, nor does it further the policy of § 162(a)(2),
to account for the duplicative expenses incurred while traveling away from home.
The general rule under § 262 is that the maintenance of a taxpayer's family residence, and the expenses incurred in travel to and from his job, are strictly nondeductible
personal expenses. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). However, Rev.
Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60, 61, provides an exception to this rule
in those unusual situations when the employee maintains a
permanent residence for that employee's family at or near the
minor or temporary post of duty, and another residence at or
near the principal post of duty. Since the employee is traveling away from the principal post of duty on business where
the employee also maintains a residence, the cost of meals and
lodging at the minor or temporary post of duty is allowed as a
deduction. Of course, the deduction is limited to that portion
of the family expenses for meals and lodging that is properly
attributable to the employee's presence there in the actual
performance of business duties.
See also Rev. Rul. 61-67, 1961-1 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51, 53.
Although the taxpayers' "tax homes" were located in their principal place of business, they did not maintain a residence at such "tax home." When they were "away from
home" while in Reno, they did not incur the duplicative costs for lodging as did the
taxpayers in Coombs. Because they did not maintain a residence at, and only rented
hotel rooms when they performed duties at, their principal place of business, they would
not qualify for the exception under Rev. Rul. 75-432.
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ers' princip~ place of employment. Once the principal place of
employment was determined, the Ninth Circuit summarily held
that the taxpayers' "tax homes" were their personal abodes in
their principal employment locale. ls9
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Coombs and
Folkman, the rule that one's "tax home" is one's personal residence or abode is firmly entrenched. Because of the mitigation
requirement in Coombs, however, the primary beneficiaries of
this rule will be construction workers who work in remote locations and are forced to live away from the general locale of their
employment. Because construction projects such as nuclear testing facilities, missile sites, dams, and remote highway and logging projects provide so few of the amenities of civilized living, it
appears that the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to recognize these
places as a taxpayer's "home" for tax purposes.

The Location of Taxpayers' Principal Place of Business Appears to be Where 'They Earn the Most Income
Through adoption of the test announced by the Sixth Circuit in Markey v. Commissioner,14o the Ninth Circuit now has a
clear method of analysis by which to determine a taxpayer's
principal place of business. Folkman, where the Ninth Circuit
first applied this three-prong definitional approach, is significant
in two respects. Initially, it refines the factual approach that the
court had previously taken to determine which of two or more
possible places constituted one's principal place of business or
employment. In addiition, it places the Ninth Circuit directly in
line with the position of the Government on this issue.141
In Folkman, prior to any determination of the actual physical location of the taxpayers' "tax homes," the Ninth Circuit had
to determine which of two possible places qualified as the princiAs a result, the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that it would allow such a travel expense
deduction is inconsistent with the policy of § 162(a)(2). See note 118 supra. Because the
taxpayers incurred no duplicative costs for lodging while "away from home," the policy
would not be furthered by the court's allowance of a deduction.
139. 615 F.2d at 496.
140. 490 F.2d 1249, 1252, 1255 (6th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 58 supra
for the text of this test.
141. Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51.
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pal place of employment.142 Through use of the Markey test, the
court focused on three principal factual considerations in order
to make its determination: (1) The length of time the taxpayer
spent at each location; (2) the taxpayer's degree of business activity at each location, and (3) the financial return to the taxpayer with respect to each location.14s
In this regard, the court's approach was clearly a refinement
of what had previously been a general factual' inquiry, as evidenced in Wills v. Commissioner144 and Frank v. United
States. 141i In Wills, the court held that the "tax home" of a professional baseball player was in Los Angeles, where his team's
ballpark was located. Although it did not apply a bright-line
test, the court determined Los Angeles to be the taxpayer's principal place of employment, even though the taxpayer maintained
his family residence in Spokane, Washington, where he also
earned a small portion of his income. l46 In Frank, a taxpayer
maintained a residence and earned a substantial portion of his
income in Oregon. l47 However, he was employed as a congressional assistant in Washington, D.C., where he spent a significant amount of his employed time. The court, in stating that the
location of one's "tax home" was a question of fact, held the
taxpayer's principal place of business· was in Oregon where he
earned most of his income. 148 Although the court recognized that
the determination of one's principal place of business involved a
question of fact, neither decision had yet suggested a clear
method of analysis.

With its decision in Coombs, the Ninth Circuit recognized
the difficulty in determining one's "tax home" when one earns a
substantial income and resides in each of two or more locales. 149
The court specifically referred to Folkman, which at that time
142. See 615 F.2d at 495-96.
143. [d. at 496.
144. 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969).
145. 577 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1978).
146. 411 F.2d at 540.
147. 577 F.2d at 96-97.
148. [d. The court considered the taxpayer's net income in each city, and the fact
that the taxpayer maintained a business office in Portland, Oregon throughout the time
he was on the Senate staff.
149. 608 F.2d at 1275 n.2.
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was docketed for appeal before the Ninth Circuit. lII0 The court
stated in dictun, citing Markey, that where a taxpayer accepts
permanent or indefinite employment away from his usual abode,
the taxpayers' "tax home" will shift to the vicinity of the taxpayer's new principal place of business. m Although Coombs did
not set out the specific principal place of business test of Markey, the court's dictum on the shift of a taxpayer's "tax home"
immediately followed its recognition of the problem presented
by the then docketed appeal of Folkman. 162 This implied that
the Ninth Circuit might adopt the Markey test to determine
one's principal place of business. As a result, when the Ninth
Circuit in Folkman subsequently adopted the Markey test, it
was not unexpected.

An additional element of significance to the tax practitioner
is that the Folkman decision is consistent with the Commissioner's approach in determining one's principal place of business. The Commissioner's position, as announced in Revenue
Ruling 54-147,1118 uses the same three criteria as the Ninth Circuit. In fact, the cowt's decision on this issue, including those
prior to Folkman, suggest that it focuses on the income element
of the Markey test, as does the Commissioner. lIS' In Wills/ISIS
Frank,1II6 and Folkman,I15'7 the court found the taxpayer's principal place of business to be where the taxpayer earned most of
his income. This finding is consistent with the approach taken in
150. Id. ("When the taxpayer both earns a substantial portion of his income and
resides in each of two or more locales, the determination of the taxpayer's home is especially difficult. See Folkman v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-29 (D. Nev. 1977),
appeals docketed, Nos. 77-3531, 77-3352 (9th Cir. Nov. I, 1977) and Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1974).").
151. 608 F.2d at 1275-76.
152. Id. See note 150 supra.
153. Notes 56 & 141 supra.
154. See note 156 supra. In Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51, 52, the Commissioner
stated the third element of the test, the income element, "should be given great weight
in cases where all the services are performed as an 'employee' . . . ."
155. 411 F.2d at 540. Wills' principal place of business was found to be Los Angeles,
where he was principally employed. He earned only $5,000.00 in Spokane, Washington,
which the court found to be his secondary place of employment.
156. 577 F.2d at 97. The taxpayer in Frank earned $325,241.00 in Portland, Oregon,
where the court found his principal place of employment, and only $4,801.00 in Washington, D.C., where the Government claimed it was.
157. In Folkman, although the taxpayers spent most of their time in Reno, Nevada,
where their personal residences were, the Ninth Circuit found their principal places of
business to be in New York and San Francisco, respectively, where they "derived the
overwhelming portion of their income •.••" 615 F.2d at 496.
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Revenue Ruling 54-147.1118 Where taxpayers earn most of their
income as employees rather than from business operations, the
Commissioner requires more emphasis be placed upon the third
consideration of the test, the income element.159
As a result of the consistencies in the positions of the Ninth
Circuit and the Commissioner, and the fact that the Ninth Circuit now has a clearly delineated approach to determine one's
principal place of business, the tax practitioner can plan accordingly with a greater degree of security. If one applies the threeprong Markey test, with a focus on its third element where the
taxpayer is an employee, one's finding of a principal place of
business will probably be the same as the Ninth Circuit's and
the Commissioner's.

Section 162(a) Provides a Stronger Basis For Mitigation of Tax
Liability Resulting from a Mandatory Meal Plan
The Ninth Circuit has provided two avenues by which employees required to participate in a meal plan as a condition of
employment may avoid tax liability for the resulting expenses.
In Sibla, where there were substantial employer imposed restrictions in connection with the taxpayers' meal expenditures, the
Ninth Circuit allowed the taxpayers to elect either a deduction
of the amount paid for meals under section 162(a), or an exclusion from income of the same amount pursuant to section 119.

Section 119
Section 119 allows employees to exclude from gross income
the value of meals furnished them by their employer for the convenience of the employer.16o However, the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Kowalski,161 and the Government in Treasury
158. See notes 56 & 141 supra.
159. See notes 56, 141 & 154 supra.
160. I.R.C. § 119.
161. 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977). See notes 18 & 101 supra and accompanying text.
In Kowalski, the majority opinion written for seven justices stated:
By its terms section 119 covers meals furnished by the employer and not cash payments for meals. This is not a mere
oversight •.• [t]he form of section 119 which Congress enacted originated in the Senate and the report accompanying
the Senate bill is very clear: "Section 119 applies only to meals
... furnished in kind." S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
190 (1954).
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Regulation section 1.119-1(c)(2),162 specifically restricted section
119's exclusion to apply to meals furnished "in kind." Because
the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the taxpayers actually met
the "in kind" requirement,163 it appears that an exclusion should
have been disallowed under the authority of Kowalski and Treasury Regulation section 1.119-1(c)(2).
Even though the Ninth Circuit recognized the implication of
Kowalski,164 it reasoned that Sibla was closely analogous to the
"in kind" situation, and that the taxpayers in Sibla substantially
complied with the requirements of section 119.165 In fact,
through its allowance of an exclusion, the court implicitly held
that substantial compliance met the "in kind" requirement.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is based on the distinction
between Kowalski and Sibla in terms of the element of control
that the taxpayers in each case had over the respective meal
plans. In its restrictive interpretation of section 119 in Kowalski,
See Note, Taxation-Cash Meal Payments Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26
L. REV. 2~5, 217 (1979), for a discussion of Kowalski.
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c){2) (T.D. 6745, July 9, 1964, 29 F.R. 9380) provides:
"The exclusion provided in section 119 applies only to meals. . . furnished in kind by an
employer to an employee."
163. 611 F.2d at 1265.
164. Id. at 1264-65.
165. Id. at 1264. Although the employer did not dire-ctly purchase the food or supervise its preparation, and did not directly collect the money, these activities were conducted at the direction of the Fire Chief. In addition, the cook was appointed by the Fire
Chief.
There is additional support for the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. Although "furnished
by the employer" is a threshold requirement for the application of § 119, it appears that
it may be met either directly or indirectly. In Rev. Rul. 71-267, 1971-1 C.B. 37, ihe value
of meals furnished by a private contractor retained by the employer for that purpose was
held excludable under § 119. 'rougher v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 737, 745-46 (1969), aff'd
per curiam, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971), held that a § 119
exclusion was unavailable to an employee who purchases supplies from his employer's
commissary, which the taxpayer then made into meals. The court gave as its reason the
fact that when the meal is provided by the employer, "he can control the time, place,
duration, value, and content of the meal to suit his convenience."
One can argue that, based upon the above Revenue Ruling and the fact that the
meals were required to be provided by the cook of the LAFD, the time, place, and duration of the meals were controlled by the taxpayers' employer. Under this argument, the
"by the employer" requirement of § 119 is substantially met. However, this still leaves
the "in kind" requirement. The value and content of the meals were not shown to be
controlled by the taxpayers' employer.
The Ninth Circuit held that the distinction between absolutely "in kind" and the
facts of this case was "too slender a reed upon which to hang tax liability." 611 F.2d at
1265.
WAYNE
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the Supreme Court made repeated references to Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass CO.166 This implied a focus by the court upon
the benefit bestowed the employee due to his receipt of cash.
Thus in Kowalski, the receipt of cash meal allowances represented a "clear accession to wealth" over which the taxpayer had
complete dominion. 167 In Sib la, the taxpayers received no cash
allowance over which they could exercise control, but were required to pay for the meals distributed at the station house
whether they ate them or not. 16S Based upon these distinctions,
the Ninth Circuit held Kowalski inapplicable to the Sibla situation. Although the court's reasoning has some merit, such substantial compliance should not be taken to meet the "furnished
in kind by the employer" test.
As Judge Kennedy pointed out in his dissent, the taxpayer's
control over the meal plan was not completely restricted. ls9 The
taxpayers exercised a certain degree of control over their meal
plans; each taxpayer was allowed to choose what he desired for
his meal period.170 The failure of the record to adequately disclose the degree of the taxpayers' control in the mess plan
should not be used as a factor for the court to bolster its "substantially in kind" reasoning. If the court kept within Kowalski's
strict interpretation of section 119, the failure of the record to
disclose the taxpayer's degree of control should lean more toward disallowance of an exclusion.
There is an additional element of concern in the Ninth Circuit's allowance of the section 119 exclusion. This concern stems
from a failure of the record to disclose a requirement in the mess
plan that each taxpayer pay a fixed amount for meals. If the
taxpayers are not bound by such a requirement, their freedom of
choice of meals is increased. Not only does this add to the taxpayers' control over the mess plan, but also, if an employee does
166. 348 U.S. 426 (1954). In Glenshaw Glass, the Court held that an exemplary
damage award received by the taxpayer was includable in gross income because it was
money over which the taxpayer had complete dominion, and as such, it was a "clear
accession to wealth." Id. at 43l.
167. 434 U.S. 77, 79-81 (1977). See notes 19 & 103 supra. See also Note, Taxation-Cash Meal Payments Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
215 (1979) for a discussion of Kowalski, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 119.
168. 611 F.2d at 1265.
169. Id. at 1266.
170.Id.
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not pay an "unvarying amount" for his or her meals, the requirements of Treasury Regulation section 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii) are
not met.
This section provides:
If an employer furnishes to an employee meals for
which the employee is charged an unvarying
amount . . . irrespective of whether he accepts
the meals, the amount of such fiat charge made
by the employee for such meals is not, as such,
part of the compensation includable in the gross
income of the employee . . . .1'l1

Assuming that the Ninth Circuit is correct in holding Kowalski inapposite to the Sibla situation, the taxpayers still failed
to meet the "fixed amount" requirement of Treasury Regulation
section 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii).
Given the fact that the taxpayers only substantially complied with the "in kind" requirement of section 119, coupled
with a failure of the record to disclose that the taxpayers paid a
fixed amount for their meals, the Ninth Circuit's allowance of an
exclusion under section 119 is questionable. This is especially so
in light of the restrictive interpretation of section 119, advanced
by Kowalski. The meals were not in fact furnished "in kind."

Section 162(a)
Section 162(a) provides a stronger basis for the court in its
effort to remove any tax liability on the part of the taxpayers
due to the mess fee requirements. This section provides: "There
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business . . . ."1'12 Thus, if a taxpayer can establish
that his expenses are an ordinary and necessary incident to the
performance of his trade or business, and are directly related,
they are deductible from his gross income pursuant to section
162(a).l'13
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii) (emphasis added). See also note 94 supra.
172. I.R.C. § 162(a).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) provides: "Business expenses deductible from gross income include ordinary and necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining
to the taxpayer's trade or business ..•."
The expenditures of the tuxpayers in this case were not only ordinary and necessary
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Although ordinary and necessary business expenses are deductible under section 162(a), meal expenditures not incurred in
travel away from home are generally considered nondeductible
personal expenses under section 262.174 Along this line, the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's meal expenditures were
also nondeductible personal expenses because they would have
been incurred anyway.1711 However, as the Ninth Circuit pointed
out, the Commissioner failed to recognize the position taken by
the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 75-316:176 "The
fact that a particular expense may under certain circumstances
be a nondeductible personal expense does not preclude the deduction of such an expense as an ordinary and necessary business expense under other circumstances."177
Because the taxpayers incurred the mess expenses as a condition of their employment, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the majority opinion of the Tax Court178 and allowed the mess fee deductions under section 162(a).179 In consideration of the
restrictive nature of the taxpayers' mess fee requirement, the allowance of such a deduction is not inconsistent with other
courts' findings and the service's position where taxpayers' expenditures were considered personal.180
to their employment, they were required as a condition of their employment. 611 F.2d at
1261.
174. I.R.C. § 262; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.262-1(a), (b)(5). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 262, personal expenditures are nondeductible unless provided for by statute. For the text of
§ 262, see note 77 supra.
175. 611 F.2d at 1262.
176. Rev. Rul. 75-316, 1975~2 C.B. 54.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (emphasis added) also provides in pertinent part:
"Except as permitted under sections 162, 212, or 217, the costs of the taxpayer's meals
not incurred in traveling away from home are personal expenses."
178. Robert E. Cooper, 67 T.C. 870, 874 (1977). ("In summary, upon consideration
of the entire record, including the unusual nature of the petitioner's employment, the
involuntary nature of the expense involved, petitioner's limited ability to physically participate in the mess, and his employer's lack of intent to compensate or otherwise benefit
the employee by enacting the [mess] requirement, we find that the amounts in issue
constitute business rather than personal expenses.").
179. 611 F.2d at 1262. The Ninth Circuit was careful to distinguish between the
taxpayers' mandatory and restrictive requirements in Sib la, and those not so restrictive,
such as in Steiner v. United States, 524 F.2d 640, 641 (10th Cir. 1975), where the court
refused a taxpayer's clainl to a deduction for uniforms which were suitable for normal
wear. See notes 17 & 91 supra.
180. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. In Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30
T.C. 757, 767 (1958), the Tax Court allowed a deduction for the cost of a taxpayer's
"high fashion" clothing which she was required to wear in performance of her job. The
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Unlike its analysis under section 119, where the court had
to stretch the "in kind" requirement and ignore the requirement
that the taxpayers pay a fixed amount for their meals, the court
under section 162(a) did not have to make such far-reaching arguments. Although meal expenditures not incurred in travel
away from home are generally considered nondeductibl~ personal expenses, they are also, if they meet the requirements of
section 162(a), deductible from income as ordinary and ~eces
sary business expenses.
In summary, Sibla involved a situation where there were
substantial employer-imposed restrictions in connection with the
taxpayers' meal expenditures. As a result, the court has gone out
'of its way to allow the taxpayers to avoid an inequitable burden.
The court provided relief in two ways: (1) allowing the taxpayer
to choose to exclude the meal payments from his gross income
under section 119, which is questionable in light of Kowalski;
and (2) allowing him to deduct the amounts pursuant to section
162(a) as business expenses. Although this type of meal deduction is not usually seen wider this section, the restrictive nature
of the conditions justifies it.
E.

CONCLUSION

The more restrictive the nature of the taxpayer's expense
requirement, the more willing the Ninth Circuit was to provide
an avenue from which the taxpayer was able to mitigate his tax
burden. In Coombs, the court achieved this result by affirming
the traditional rule on the location of "tax home" in the Ninth
Circuit; it is at the taxpayer's personal residence or abode. However, it appears the Ninth Circuit requires taxpayers to mitigate
their expenses and maintain their personal residences or abodes
in or as near the city of their employment as is reasonably
possible.
fact that the clothing was suitable for normal wear in certain lifestyles was not controlling because the taxpayer preferred a more simple lifestyle.
In Inman v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 1168 (1970), a forest ranger was required to
live in a Park Service house and pay his own utility bills. The court allowed the taxpayer
to deduct a proportionate share of his lodging related expenses.
Rev. Rul. 58-382, 1958-2 C.B. 59, provided for a deduction of the expenses related to
a twice yearly medical examination of a pilot who was required at his own expense to
obtain a satisfactory medical certificate. Because this was required by the taxpayer's employer, it was deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense pursuant to § 162(a).
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Before application of the "tax home" rule in Folkman, the
court had to determine the location of the taxpayers' principal
place of business. The court in this· vein adopted the Markey
test. With a determination of the principal place of business,
and hence the "tax home," the taxpayers were able to deduct
travel expenses incurred between their primary and secondary
places of employment.
Finally, in Sibla, the court provided two avenues of relief
for taxpayers who were required as a condition of their employment to participate in a mandatory meal plan at their own expense. Initially, the court provided for a business expense deduction under section 162(a). Although unusual, it was justified by
the restrictive nature of the taxpayers' job requirements. In addition, the court allowed for an exclusion of the same amount
from income under section 119. This result is questionable in
light of Commissioner v. Kowalski,181 where the Supreme Court
held that in order for the value of meals to be excluded from a
taxpayer's income under section 119, the meals must be furnished to the employee in-kind.
Robert C. Gabrielski*

II. THE SALE OF "ALMOST PATENTED" PROPERTY TO
A RELATED PERSON WILL NO LONGER BE TAXED
AT CAPITAL GAINS RATES IN THE NINTH CmCUIT
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Myers v. United States, l the Ninth Circuit held that for
the purposes of section 1239,2 "almost patented" property is to
be considered property subject to the depreciation allowance
181. 434 u.s. 77 (1977). See notes 18 & 101 supra, and accompanying text.
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 613 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Cordova, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Kennedy, J. and Hug, J.).
2. I.R.C. § 167. Internal Revenue Code § 167 provides: "There shall be allowed as a
depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear . • . (1) of
property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of
income."
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provided for in section 167.3 Thus, as "almost patented" property, a transfer to a controlled corporation' of a patent application for which the United States Patent Office has issued a notice of allowance, falls within the purview of section 1239. The
proceeds from the sale of such property will therefore be taxed
as ordinary income.
B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

June L. Myers (Taxpayer), the widow of John W. Myers,
was the sole owner of all the issued and outstanding stock of
Myers Electric Products, Inc. (Myers Electric)}~ John W. Myers
initially filed patent application number 439,533 with respect to
his invention, a coupling for electric conduits, on June 28, 1954.
On December 1, 1958 he filed a second patent application, number 777,321, which was a continuation of patent application
number 439,533.6 Patent application number 777,321, consisting
of three claims, was rejected in its entirety by the Patent Examiner on January 30, 1959. Upon appeal, the Examiner's decision
was reversed by the Board of Appeals as to claims one and two
on January 2, 1963. On January 31, 1963 a "Notice of Allow3. I.R.C. § 1239, in effect at the time of Taxpayer's transaction, provides in pertinent part:
(a) TREATMENT OF GAIN AS ORDINARY INCOMEIn the case of a sale or exchange, directly or indirectly, of
property described in subsection (b) (between "related persons") . . . any Ilain recognized to the transferor from the sale
or exchange of such property shall be considered as gain from
the sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property described in section 123l.
(b) SECTION APPLICABLE ONLY TO SALES OR EXCHANGES OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY. This section
shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange by a transferor of property which in the hands of the transferee is property of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.
4. For the purposes of Myers' transaction, a controlled corporation under
§ 1239(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (now l.R.C. § 1239(b)(2», is one
where the taxpayer owns more than 80% in value of the outstanding stock.
5. Myers v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119593, at 88,002-03 (N.D. Cal.
1977). John W. Myers incorporated Myers Electric Products, Inc., as a California corporation on June 30, 1950. He died on September 19, 1959, and on June 29, 1963 June L.
Myers owned all the issued and outstanding stock in Myers Electric Products, Inc. 77-2
U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,003. Taxpayer filed timely federal income tax returns for the relevant
years, 1967 through 1974. [d. at 88,004.
6. [d. at 88,003. Upon filing of patent application number 777,321, patent application number 439,533 was abandoned.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/14

36

Gabrielski and Fanucci: Taxation

1981]

TAXATION

419

ance" was mailed with respect to Patent Application Number
777,321. 7 .
Upon John W. Myers' death on September 19, 1959, Taxpayer, as qualified Administratrix of decedent's estate, intervened and assumed protection of the patent.s After assigning the
estate's interest to herself, Taxpayer, on June 29, 1963, granted
Myers Electric the "sole and exclusive right, privilege and license to use, manufacture, produce, distribute and sell" the invention covered by patent application number 777,321 for a period of twenty years. 9 In exchange for the transfer, Myers
Electric agreed to pay royalties on gross sales to Taxpayer.1o On
Taxpayer's federal income tax returns for 1967 through 1974,
she claimed the royalty payments as ordinary income.l l After
the June 29, 1963 transfer date, Myers Electric paid the $30.00
filing fee required by the Patent Office, and on September 17,
1963, letters patent were issued with respect to patent application number 777,321.12 This case appeared before the district
court and on appeal before the Ninth Circuit in the posture of a
tax refund suit.
Finding that the transferee merely had tb pay the $30.00
filing fee in order for letters patent to issue, the district court
held that the patent application had "sufficiently matured" so as
to constitute property of a character subject to an allowance for
depreciation within the provisions of section 167.13 As a result,
the district court found that Taxpayer's sale of the property to
Myers Electric, a corporation she wholly controlled, should necessarily be governed by section 1239.14 Section 1239 provides
7.Id.
8. Id. Taxpayer notified the United States Patent Office on May 29, 1963 that she
had assumed protection of patent application number 777,321.
9. Id. The estate's interest was 90%, because Mr. Myers had previously transferred
a 10% interest to one Brodie AhIport in 1954. Mr. AhIport also assigned his 10% interest
along with Taxpayer to Myers Electric.
10. [d.
11. [d.
12. [d. The payment of the filing fee was essential to the issuance of letters patent.
13. The court relied upon the reasoning of Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner, 442
F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971), and also referred to Davis v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 709 (6th
Cir. 1974). The patent application had been transferred to Myers Electric five months
after the notice of allowance had issued, and three months prior to the issuance of letters
patent. Id. at 88,004.
14. [d. at 88,004-05.
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that where an individual sells to a related person, 111 property
which is of a character Bubject to depreciation under section 167,
any income recognized by the individual taxpayer should be considered ordinary income.16
The district court found Taxpayer's actions to be of the
type section 1239 was intended to scrutinize. Section 1239 was
designed to prevent situations where a taxpayer, owning property with a marketable value substantially in excess of the taxpayer's basis in the property, transfers such property to a related corporation at its market value. In such a situation, at only
the cost of a capital gains tax, the taxpayer continues in control
of the property by way of his or her control over the corporation.
At the same time, the corporation is able to step up the basis of
the transferred propelty and take greater depreciation deductions against ordinary incomeP The district court found the
capital gains provisiollS to be strictly interpreted,18 and that
Taxpayer's income was correctly reported as ordinary income.19
C.

THE

NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING

In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit focused on two questions:
whether patent application number 777,321 was property of a
character subject to depreciation in the hands of Taxpayer; and
if so, whether any gam recognized on the sale to Myers Electric
was ordinary income under section 1239.20 As did the district
court, the Ninth Circuit found that section 1239 was intended to
prevent taxpayers from selling appreciated property to a controlled corporation at the cost of a capital gains tax, while maintaining control over the asset and reaping the benefit of depreciation deductions against ordinary income through a stepped-up
15. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1239(a)(2) (now I.R.C. § 1239(b)(2» defined a
"related person" as "an individual and a corporation more than 80 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of which is owned by such individual, his spouse, and his minor
children and grandchildren •..." See note 4 supra.
16. I.R.C. § 1239.
17. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Congo 1st Sess. 29 (1951».
18. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,004-05.
19. Id. at 88,005. For a broad reading of Code § 1239, in that the term "property of
a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation" should be interpreted so
as to apply to the transaction in Myers, in order to limit the classes of transactions
qualifying for capital gains, the court relied on Commissioner V. Gilette Motor Co., 364
U.S. 130 (1960) and Corn Prods. CO. V. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
20. 613 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1955).
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basis.21 In determining whether this particular patent application constituted depreciable property to be governed by section
1239, the court focused on the "evolutionary process" of a patent. 22 At one end of the scale is a patent application, bearing
with it assignable property rights but no determinable useful life
upon which to base depreciation. At the other extreme is the
patent, which without dispute, is depreciable and falls within
the purview of section 1239.23 The patent application at issue
was at neither extreme. To allow Taxpayer's patent application
to fall outside the purview of section 1239, however, would
thwart the purpose of that section.
The court found that there is a point on the evolutionary
scale where the possibility of issuance of letters patent becomes
overshadowed by the actual probability of issuance. 24 In order to
determine whether Taxpayer's patent application had crossed
the line to probability of issuance, and therefore should be governed by section 1239, the Ninth Circuit adopted part of the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning announced in Stahl v. Commissioner.25 Under the Stahl doctrine, where an official notices of
allowance is received by the transferor prior to the sale of a patent application, the patent application will be considered "sufficiently matured" so as to qualify as a patent under section
1239.26 If a patent application is "virtually certain to mature
into a depreciable patent . . . with the merest of diligence by
the transferee in processing the applications after the sale, a
mechanistic distinction between patents and those patent applications which have been the subject of official indications of allowability is unwarranted. "27
21. Id.
22. Id. The court recognized that patent applications go through an "evolutionary
process" which includes a patent application, a letter of appearance of allowability, a
formal notice of allowance, and finally the issuance of letters ·patent.
23. 613 F.2d at 231 (citing Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.
1930) (longstanding authority for the rule that actual patents are depreciable property».
24. 613 F.2d at 232. Although not noted in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Myers, the
Tax Court followed a test similar to that announced in Stahl v. Commissioner. See Davis
v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 31 T.C.M. (B.N.A.) 1155
(1972); Eckel v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (B.N.A.) 147 (1974).
25. 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
26. 613 F.2d at 232.
27.Id.
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In distinguishing Chu v. Commissioner,2s a case asserted by
Taxpayer as explicitly rejecting the Stahl doctrine, the court
noted that in Chu, the taxpayer merely received notification of
the possible issuance of a patent by the receipt of a letter of
appearance of allowability.29 Chu had not received a formal notice of allowance, which under the Ninth Circuit's rationale
would be more akin to the probable issuance of a patent.30 The
Ninth Circuit stated that the First Circuit in Chu attempted to
apply the reasoning of Stahl, but could not because a notice of
allowance had not been issued to the taxpayer in ChU. 31 As a
result, Chu was factually distinguishable.
The court rejected Taxpayer's further contention that she
was entitled to rely upon the law as it existed at the time of the
transfer. The Myers panel found her claim to be without merit
because she did not actually rely on the law extant at the time of
the transfer, nor did she treat the proceeds from the sale as capital gains. 32
In conclusion, the panel found that the letters patent would
have issued upon paym.ent of the final $30.00 fee in the normal
28. 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973).
29. 613 F.2d at 232. The Ninth Circuit noted that in Chu, the taxpayer assigned his
patent application after the Patent Office had informed him that only six minor claims
of his original 18 claims appeared allowable, while the crux of the patent application was
disallowed. A notice of allowance was issued only after an amended application was filed
after the transfer.
30. 613 F.2d at 352.
31. Id.
32. The relevant tax law extant in 1963 was Code § 1239 and the regulations
promUlgated thereunder. Taxpayer, before the Ninth Circuit, relied upon a Solicitor's
Memorandum issued in June 1928, which stated that applications for patents are generally not property subject to depreciation. S.M. 5038, C.B. V. I, Jan. - June, 1928, at 247.
(Both parties conceded that at the time of the transfer there was no case law on the
subject. Id.)
In addition, Taxpayer claimed that she should not be governed by Rev. Rul. 67-136,
1967-1 C.B. 58, which, issued in 1967 - after the transfer - provided that patent applications are subject to depreciation when letters patent will issue in the normal course of
events.ld.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Taxpayer's arguments on the ground ,that Taxpayer did
not actually rely on the Solicitor's Memorandum of 1928. The court also stated that
applications for letters patent are not property subject to depreciation. 613 F.2d at 253.
At the time Taxpayer filed her returns, she treated the proceeds from the sale of the
patent application as ordinary income, and not as capital gains; the Ninth Circuit found
it obvious that Taxpayer did not rely on the Solicitor's Memorandum. 613 F.2d at 232.
As a result, the court did not address the issue of whether Taxpayer had a right to rely
on the Solicitor's Memorandum.
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course of events. 33 Under these circumstances, the patent application had "matured," and was subject to a section 167 depreciation allowance. Therefore, the proceeds from the sale of the application to Myers Electric, Taxpayer's wholly owned and
controlled corporation, were correctly treated as ordinary income
under section 1239.34

D.

ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING

Legislative Intent of Section 1239 Upheld
With the Myers decision, the Ninth Circuit has closed what
was a loophole in the Code. Taxpayers, at least in the Ninth Circuit, will no longer be able to transfer "almost patented" property to their controlled corporations315 without recognizing ordinary income. 36 Rather than take a restrictive reading of the
statutory language, the Ninth Circuit focused on the spirit and
legislative intent of section 1239. Clearly the decision is consistent with the purpose of the section which provides as follows:
In the case of a sale or exchange of property . . .

between related taxpayers, any gain recognized to
the transferor shall be treated as ordinary income
if such property is, in the hands of the transferee,
of a character which is subject to an allowance for
depreciation provided for in section 167.37

Whether "almost patented" property constitutes "property
of a character subject to a depreciation allowance under section
167,"3s a threshold requirement of section 1239,39 is an issue pre33. 613 F.2d at 232.
34. [d. at 233.
35. In order for a taxpayer to come within the purview of Code § 1239, the taxpayer
must cross the SO% or more ownership threshold of Code § 1239(b)(2) or (b)(3), unless
the two related taxpayers are husband and wife, in which case there is no SO% requirement. Additionally, to determine constructive ownership of stock, Code § 1239(c) invokes
the attribution rules of Code § 31S. Note that the result in Myers remains unchanged by
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Revenue Act of 1975.
36. With the Ninth Circuit's decision that "almost patented" property is property of
a character subject to an allowance for depreciation, Code § 1239(a) would require that
any gain recognized by a taxpayer on transfer of "almost patented" property to a related
person as defined by Code § 1239(b) be treated as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1239(a).
37. I.R.C. § 1239(a). Other than for the definition of a "related taxpayer," which was
not at issue in the instant case, see note 39 infra, current Code § 1239(a) is no different
in substance than § 1239(a) and (b) of the 1954 Code, which were in effect when the
transfer in issue took place. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, current Code § 1239
will be used for the purpose of analysis.
3S. I.R.C. § 167.
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viously undecided by the Ninth Circuit. Had the court read section 1239 literally, without consideration of its purpose, Taxpayer would have been able to avoid its grasp. Transfers of nonpatented property would generally be considered outside the
purview of section 1239, as not being of a character subject to
depreciation under section 167."°
Not only was the particular issue in Myers one of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, but there was little decisional authority outside the circuit for which the panel could look for guidance. Although there is little case law that directly addresses
the issue in the instant case, a literal application of section 1239
would have placed a premium upon compliance with the mere
formalities of that section while ignoring its purpose and substance. If the section was inapplicable until property transferred
between "related taxpayers" was actually patented, it would be
subject to flagrant abuse. In fact, "related taxpayers" might be
able to completely avoid the application of section 1239 to their
transfers of "almost patented" property. For example, assume
the scenario wherein a taxpayer applies for letters patent on a
low basis, highly appreciated invention. When and if a formal
notice of allowance is issued on the patent application, the taxpayer then transfers his or her rights in the patent to a "related
taxpayer." Upon payment of the final filing fee by transferee,
the Patent Office issues letters patent. Because the patent would
39. Section 1239(a) of the 1954 Code required that the transaction take place between "related taxpayers" as does current Code § 1239. However, current Code § 1239
defines a "related taxpayer" more broadly. See notes 4 & 15 supra. Because Taxpayer in
Myers owned 100% of the outstanding stock of Myers Electric, the "related taxpayer"
threshold is not at issue.
40. Section 167 of the Code provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a depreciation
deduction a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear. . . (1) of property used
in a trade or business, or (2) of property used for the production of income." Treasury
Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 provides that because of their determinable useful life, patents
are intangibles which are subject to an allowance for depreciation. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-3 (1976). See Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930).
While it is undisputed that patents, if used in a taxpayer's trade or business are considered depreciable under Code § 167, as a general rule, patent applications are considered
intangibles with an indeterminate useful life, and therefore nondepreciable. Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1974); Davis v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ~ 9321, 83,430 (1974). The Treasury Regulations make no 'Provision for patent
applications. Although nondepreciable as a general rule, patent applications have been
held depreciable by some courts. See Stahl v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1971); Best Lock Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1217 (1958); Century Tank Mfg. Co. v,
Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 430 (1959); see Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58, cited
in Myers v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d at 232.
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now be considered a depreciable asset,41 whose basis in the
hands of the transferee would be stepped-up to its purchase
, price,42 the transferee could take greater depreciation deductions
against ordinary income than could the transferor. Moreover, at
only the expense of a capital gains tax,43 the transferor would
enjoy the tax benefits that inure to the transferee because of his
or her control over the transferee. 44 This is precisely the result
sought by the taxpayer in Myers.
Recognizing this potential for abuse, the Ninth Circuit applied section 1239 in an effort to further its policy and legislative
intent.411 Through enactment of section 1239, Congress sought to
prevent the practice of selling low basis, highly appreciatied capital assets to a spouse or controlled corporation, where the transferee would obtain a stepped-up cost basis in the asset and
thereby be able to take greater depreciation deductions than
could the transferor. Congress recognized that because the transferor still had control of the asset, the tax benefit would rebound
to that transferor at the cost of only a capital gains tax on the
proceeds of the transfer. 46 Congress again asserted its intent for
41. See note 40 supra.
42. Code § 1012 provides that the basis of purchased property in this case would be
its cost.
43. Under Code § 1221, a patent application would be considered a capital asset,
and its sale would generally yield capital gains.
44. STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 114757.03, at 54,240 (1979), which suggests that the
"beauty of [such a scenario] is that, if the invention is later patented by the purchasing
corporation, it will become depreciable at that time." However, CCH does caution that
"if the patent has been applied for on the invention and if it is virtually certain that the
patent will issue in due course, section 1239 . . • cannot be avoided, at least in the Seventh Circuit." ld. at 54,241 (referring to Stahl v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.
1971».
There is particular reason to fear abuse in the transfer of patent applications to a
close corporation where the close corporation is a Subchapter S corporation. This fear
follows from the basic premise that a Subchapter S corporation itself pays no tax on its
income, except capital gains in certain instances. Income is passed through the corporation and becomes the income of the shareholders to be reported on their individual returns. I.R.C. § 1373; Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a), (e) (1978). Thus, there is no double tax
(tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels), and the controlling shareholders receive substantial benefits on the transfer.
45. 613 F.2d at 231.
46. H. R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1951). See MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CODE, § 1239
(1979); 4 TAX MNGM'T (BNA) Primary Sources, Series IT, § 1239 (1977). Although § 1239
was not intended to enjoy broad application, such intent was directed toward the definition of "related taxpayers," and not the definition of depreciable property. MERTENS,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CODE, § 1239 at 95 (1979).
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scrutiny of such transa.ctions in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, in
which it sought to broaden the definition of "related taxpayers"
in order to prevent abuse of the term by those attempting to
avoid section 1239.4 '1
Although Congress specifically defined the participants in a
section 1239 transaction,4s it was less specific in its description
of the applicable property. Section 1239(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 195449 defines property within its purview as "property of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167."110 Because section 1239 does not
specifically restrict its application to actual depreciable property, but uses the term "property of a character" subject to a
depreciation allowance, it leaves room for judicial interpretation.
The court's finding that during the evolutionary process of a
patentlll there is a point at which the probability of the issuance
of letters patent outweighs the possibility of issuance, provides
the basis for its interpretation of section 1239.112 However, lacking precedent in the circuit to determine whether a patent application at such a point should be considered depreciable for the
purposes of section 1239, the court looked to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Stahl v. Commissioner. liS
On similar facts, the Seventh Circuit in Stahl held that
where a transferor receives a notice of allowance prior to sale,
the patent application is sufficiently matured so as to constitute
depreciable property for the purposes of section 1239.M The
47. I.R.C. § 1239 was promulgated when Congress recognized abuse in transfers of
property between "related taxpayers." I.R.C. § 1239, as amended by Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1922. Because § 1239 originally defined "related taxpayers" narrowly, taxpayers were able to structure transactions so as to circumvent §
1239. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 incorporated by reference the attribution rules of §
318 to prevent such abuse. [3} MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CODE
COMMENTARY, § 1239, at 96 (1979).
48. I.R.C. § 318 is incorporated by reference in § 1239(c) and maintains specific
rules in determining constructive ownership of stock.
49. I.R.C. § 1239(a).
50. I.R.C. § 1239(b) (19M) (now LR.C. § 1239(a» (emphasis added).
51. 613 F.2d at 232. The court found that patent applications proceed along the
continuum from the initial patent application, through the letter of appearance of allowability, the official notice of allowance, and finally the issuance of letters patent. 613 F.2d
at 231. See note 22 supra.
52. 613 F.2d 232.
53. 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. 442 F.2d at 328. The facts in Stahl are similar to those in Myers insofar as the
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transferee had only to exercise the "merest of diligence" in
processing the application to obtain letters patent. lUi Under the
basic premise of the Stahl rationale, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a mechanistic distinction between an actual patent
and a patent application coupled with a notice of allowance was
unwarranted.1i6 The distinction would allow a transferee, through
a ministerial duty in the normal business course, to transform
what would be considered a non-depreciable patent application
into a depreciable patent without being subject to the scrutiny
of section 1239.1i'7 In this regard, the Ninth Circuit's decision is
clearly within the "mere diligence" rationale of Stahl, 1i8 and
moreover, furthers the policy of section 1239.1i9 The court has
effectively prevented section 1239 from becoming an elective
provision with regard to transfers of patent applications.

The Ninth Circuit is Unlikely to Consider Patent Applications
Depreciable Prior to the Issuance of a Notice of Allowance
While the Ninth Circuit properly adopted that part of the
Stahl rationale which applies section 1239 to transfers of patent
applications coupled with a notice· of allowance,80 it did not
adopt the complete holding of Stahl. Not only did the Stahl
court apply section 1239 to transfers of patent applications coupled with a notice of allowance, it also extended section 1239's
threshold to an even earlier point along the evolutionary continuum, the point at which a notice of appearance of allowability
patents transferred were accompanied with a notice of allowance. In Stahl, the taxpayer
also transferred one patent application coupled only with a letter of appearance of allowability. 442 F.2d at 327-28. A patent application coupled with a letter of appearance of
allowability was not at issue in Myers, nor did the Ninth Circuit adopt that part of the
Stahl holding.
55. 442 F.2d at 328.
56. 613 F.2d at 231-32.
57. In Myers the transferee had only to pay the $30 filing fee required by the United
States Patent Office in order to obtain letters patent. ld. at 231. Clearly this was a ministerial duty.
.
58. In addition, the Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with the position of the
Internal Revenue Service announced in Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58. Although issued after Taxpayer's transfer in Myers, the Revenue Ruling provides that if the invention covered by the patent application is one for which a patent will issue in the normal
course of business, and the purchase price is fixed as a percentage of earnings over its
life, it is considered depreciable. Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58, 59.
59. See notes 17, 21 & 46 supra.
60. 613 F.2d at 232. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Myers effectively moves the
threshold for invoking § 1239 to the point at which an official notice of allowance has
been issued and where the patent will issue in the normal course of events.
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has been issued. 61 Because a patent application coupled with a
notice of appearance of allowability occurs at an even earlier
point along the evolutionary life of a patent, it may require more
than the merest of diligence on the part of the transferee in order to become an actual patent. Given the opportunity, it appears unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would find such a patent
application "sufficiently matured" so as to constitute depreciable property under s'ection 1239.
As initially noted by the First Circuit in Chu v. Commissioner,62 a patent application which only appears allowable may
require more than mere diligence to obtain letters patent. In
Chu, after the initial application for letters patent, the taxpayer
received a letter of appearance of allowability as to five of his
original eighteen claims; the heart of his application was rejected. Two later amendments over a period of two years led
only to a similar letter on one other claim of the original eighteen. 6S At this point, the taxpayer transferred his interest in the
patent application to his controlled corporation. The corporation
filed a third amendment and was issued a notice of allowance
ten months after the transfer, a full three and one half years
after the taxpayer was first notified that the patent application
appeared allowable.6<'
Chu illustrates the fact that more than mere diligence may
be required to obtain letters patent where the application only
appears allowable. The transferee was required to file an
amended application after the transfer. 6G In addition, it appears
that the transferee could not be sure letters patent would issue
after the amendment because the patent application was previously rejected three times. In this light, the First Circuit rejected
the government's argument that the issue before the court
61. 442 F.2d at 328. The Seventh Circuit in Stahl held that both a patent application that received a letter of appearance of allowability as well as two applications that
received official notices of allowance were sufficiently matured so as to constitute depreciable property for the purpose of § 1239.
62. 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973). Chu involved a transfer of patent rights by a taxpayer to his controlled corporation prior to the issuance of a notice of allowance. In
Myers, Taxpayer argued that the First Circuit in Chu expressly rejected the Stahl doctrine and so should the Ninth Circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit found both Chu and
Stahl factually distinguishable and thus rejected Taxpayer's argument. 632 F.2d at 232.
63. 486 F.2d at 698.
64. [d. at 699.
65. [d.
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should be governed by the Stahl doctrine.66 Though the First
Circuit wished to "intimate no view" as the validity of the Stahl
doctrine,67 the court held that "even assuming the validity of the
Stahl doctrine, it is beyond doubt that the patent application at
issue in this case had not sufficiently matured within the meaning of that decision so as to be considered a depreciable patent
for the purposes of section 1239."68
Although the Ninth Circuit was able to factually distinguish
Chu,69 it recognized that a patent application which only appeared allowable balanced more heavily toward the possibility of
issuance of letters patent, and did not have the probability of
issuance that adheres to a formal notice of allowance. 70 Where
the patent application is not virtually certain to mature upon
the exercise of mere diligence by the transferee-such as payment of the filing fee in Myers-there is less fear of abuse of
section 1239. For example, if a patent application that only appeared allowable was not approved subsequent to a transaction
governed by section 1239, the transferor would have recognized
66. ld. at 702.
67. ld. The First Circuit had difficulty with the Stahl rationale, especially insofar as
it dealt with letters of appearance of allowability. The First Circuit pointed out that the
Seventh Circuit may have been too quick to assume that patent applications to which
notices of allowance have issued will mature into patents with the merest of diligence in
processing the application. 486 F.2d at 703 n.8. The court cited Rule 313 of the Rules of
Practice of the United States Patent Office, and stated that the allowance may be withdrawn at any time prior to the issuance of letters patent for reason of mistake on the
part of the Patent Office, fraud or illegality in the application, or other interference.
However, as the First Circuit had only letters of appearance of allowability at issue, and
then only on a portion of the patent application, its discourse on the withdrawal of the
notice of allowance in relation to the Stahl doctrine was dictum. Its discussion does
show, however, that a letter of appearance of allowability, which is issued at an earlier
point in the evolution of a patent is a tenuous prediction of issuance of letters patent.
68.ld.
69. 613 F.2d at 232. The Ninth Circuit recognized the First Circuit in Chu was unable to apply the Stahl doctrine because Chu dealt with a letter of appearance of allowability as to only six of eighteen claims on a patent application while the heart of the
patent application was rejected. 486 F.2d at 698-99. The Stahl doctrine applied to patents coupled with a notice of allowance or letters of appearance of allowability. 442 F.2d
at 328. However, although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the First Circuit did not
expressly reject the Stahl doctrine, it failed to point out the First Circuit's difficulty with
that doctrine. See note 67 supra.
The First Circuit's discussion on Stahl was dictum because neither a complete letter
of appearance of allowability or notice of allowance was issued on the patent application
at issue. See 486 F.2d at 698-99. Therefore, Taxpayer's contention in Meyers that the
First Circuit explicitly rejected the Stahl doctrine is without merit.
70. 613 F.2d at 232.
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ordinary income on the transaction, while the controlled corporation would be unable to take depreciation deductions because
the asset would still be considered non-depreciable.71 This would
be a harsh result, and moreover, would not further the purpose
of section 1239. Apparently, the Ninth Circuit tacitly recognized
such a potential result when it determined that a patent application which appeared allowable had only a possibility of issuance
of letters patent and not a probability of issuance. 72 Based upon
this finding, and the fact that it did not adopt the complete
holding of Stahl, the Ninth Circuit would probably not extend
the application of section 1239 to transfers that involve patent
applications coupled only with letters of appearance of
allowability.78
E.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Myers supports congressional policy that transfers of depreciable property between "related taxpayers" be subject to scrutiny under section 1239. In
the Ninth Circuit, a taxpayer cannot, without recognizing ordinary income, transfer to a "related taxpayer" a patent application which is the subject of a notice of allowance, where the patent will issue in the normal business course.
Where the seller, prior to the transfer, has been issued a
notice of allowance 011 a patent application, the patent will probably issue upon the exercise of mere diligence by the transferee.
Had the Ninth Circuit held section 1239 inapplicable to such a
transaction, a seller could avoid section 1239 by holding a patent
application until it is the subject of a notice of allowance, and
then transfer it to a controlled corporation whereupon it will become a depreciable SlSset.
It appears unlikely, however, that the Ninth Gircuit in the
future will extend the threshold for invoking section 1239 to a
71. The asset would be considered a patent application, and hence non-depreciable
as a general rule. See note 40 supra.
72. 613 F.2d at 231-32.
73. If the Ninth Circuit did adopt that part of the Stahl rationale which applied
Code § 1239 to transfers of patents coupled with letters of appearance of allowability, it
would have been considered dictum because such a patent application was not at issue.
However, the court had an opportunity to indicate its future direction, but chose not to
extend its rule to patent applications that appeared allowable.
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patent application subject only to a letter of appearance of allowability. This letter occurs at an earlier point in the evolutionary life of a patent than does a notice of allowance, and there is
less of a likelihood that such a patent application will become a
patent in the normal business course. Hence, there is less fear
for abuse of section 1239.
Robert C. Gabrielski*

III. THE PROPER TREATMENT OF BAD DEBT LOSS INVOLVING INTRAFAMILY LOANS
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Hunsaker v. Commissioner, 1 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that loans of large sums of money made by
a son to his father and his father's corporation were not made in
connection with the son's trade or business as required by section 166(1)(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Thus,
the losses from these loans were subject to short term capital
loss treatment as nonbusiness bad debts under section 166(d) of
the Code rather than deductible in full from the taxpayer's ordinary income. The court further held that the Tax Court erred as
a matter of law in finding that payments made by the taxpayer
as guarantor on certain performance bonds were deductible
under section 166(f) of the Code which provides a limited exception to section 166(a) for guarantee agreements entered into
prior to 1976. The court reaffirmed that the proper focus for determining worthless debt under section 166(f) is on the original
obligation between the principal and creditor, and not on the
guarantor's or indemnitor's claim against the principal.
B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Richard Hunsaker (Taxpayer) and his father were both engaged in land development, real estate, and other separate busi* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 615 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Goodwin, J., the other panel members were
Wallace and Farris, JJ.).
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nesses prior to the years in issue.2 In 1965, Taxpayer's father
organized a CalifornisL corporation, SVH Investments (SVH), for
the purpose of land development. Taxpayer loaned substantial
sums of money to his father and SVH over a period of several
years. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes at eight
percent interest.3 The loans were used by Taxpayer's father in
an attempt to keep SVH solvent. SVH had operated with a negative cash flow and had other financial difficulties between the
years in issue. Taxpayer had never held stock in the
corporation!
In 1968 Taxpayer became director of SVH after his father
suffered an incapaciting stroke, and in 1969 he became vice president and chief operating officer. He received no salary or compensation for his services. 5 Taxpayer's father died in 1969. Because the corporation was insolvent, Taxpayer was unable to
collect the loans advanced to his father and SVH.6

Taxpayer treated the losses from the uncollectible loans as
business losses under section 166(a) of the Code and currently
deducted the amount of the loss in full from his ordinary income.'1 The tax commissioner asserted that the debt losses suf2. Taxpayer's main business was in the development and sale of real estate, having
constructed and sold over 5,000 homes and buildings between 1954 and 1961. Many of
these ventures were conducted in association with Taxpayer's father. Hunsaker v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 985,985 (1975).
3. Of the amounts advanced by Taxpayer to his father, $37,949.69 became uncollectible in 1968 and $38,214.80 in 1969. With respect to SVH, Taxpayer made direct advancements, $35,000 and $131,575 of which became uncollectible in 1968 and 1969,
repectively. ld. at 985,988.
4. Advances (direct or indirect) to corporations by stockholders provide the most
common examples of nonbusiness debts. See, e.g. Towers v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1957).
5. The loans Taxpayer made after he took control of SVH, following his father's
stroke and subsequent death, were not aruged by Taxpayer to deserve separate tax treatment because he had assumed an active role in the affairs of the corporation. The Ninth
Circuit noted that in light of Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), Taxpayer
would be prohibited from doing so. The Whipple court determined that furnishing regular services to a corporation without more is not a trade or business. As in Whipple,
Taxpayer received no salary for his services. Furthermore, in United States v. Generes,
405 U.S. 93 (1972), the Supreme Court found that the taxpayer's relatively small salary
from the corporation was insufficient to allow the taxpayer's indemnification losses as
business bad debts which ta:tpayer claimed to have been made to protect his status as an
employee.
6. Taxpayer's father's estate was insolvent. The father had owned over 80% of SVH.
7. I.R.C. § 166(a) provides:
(a) General Rule:
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fered by Taxpayer were nonbusiness losses, thus deductible only
as a short-term capital loss under section 166(d) of the Code.8
The Tax Court upheld the commissioner's finding, and Taxpayer appealed.
Factual Background for Government's Cross-Appeal

Shortly after the formation of SVH, Taxpayer's father began improving undeveloped land in Serene Lakes, California. In
connection with this project Taxpayer's father and his partner,
Frank Patty, the record owner of the Serene Lakes property, executed as principals faithful performance bonds funded by the
surety, General Insurance Company of America, in favor of Sierra and Placer Counties. In 1967, Taxpayer purchased an irrevocable letter of credit and deposited it as collateral with the
surety in favor of the County of Placer and Sierra Lakes County
Water District concerning SVH's Serene Lakes project. Patty
was required to be principal on the bonds because the county
and water district required the record owner's signature.
In a separate agreement that became the primary focus of
this cross-appeal, Taxpayer agreed to hold Patty (the second
principal on the bond) harmless from any liability in connection
with the performance bonds in consideration of Patty's promises
(1) Wholly worthless debts. There shall be allowed as a
deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(2) Partially worthless debts. When satisfied that a debt is
recoverable only in part, the Secretary may allow such debt, in
an amount not in excess of the part charged off within the
taxable year, as a deduction.
S. I.R.C. § 166(d) provides:
(d) Nonbusiness debts:
(1) General Rule. In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within
the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year,
of a capital asset held for not more than 1 year.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes of paragraph
(1), the term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in
connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.
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to extend purchase options to SVH and to Taxpayer to repurchase the Serene Lakes property which Patty had acquired from
SVH as security for loans he had advanced to the corporation in
1969 and 1970. Taxpayer was required to pay under the collateral agreement the expenses of completing the improvements on
the property. Taxpayer was unable to recoup any of the costs of
completing the improvements due to his father's insolvency and
his own hold harmless agreement with Patty.9
As guarantor on the bonds, Taxpayer deducted the amounts
he paid on the performance bonds pursuant to section 166(f) of
the Code.10 The Tax Court upheld Taxpayer's treatment of the
payments made on the performance bonds and the government
took a cross-appeal.
C.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Taxpayer's Appeal

On appeal, Taxpa.yer argued that the loans in question were
made in direct connection with either his money lending or real
estate business. He further contended that his sole motive in advancing money and credit to his father and SVH was to enter
into a joint venture with his father concerning the Serene Lakes
project.
The court first addressed the issue of whether Taxpayer was
in the trade or business of lending money. A business bad debt
deduction will not be allowed unless a taxpayer can establish
that (1) he had a trade or business; and (2) the acquisition or
9. In 1969 and 1970, Taxpayer was required to pay $45,129.28 and $82,682, respectively, for expenses SVH could not pay under the terms of the collateral agreement. 34
T.C.M. (CCH) at 985,987 (1975).
10. I.R.C. § 166(f) states as follows:
A payment by the taxpayer (other than a corporation) in
discharge of part or all of his obligation as a guarantor, or endorser, or indemnitor on a noncorporate obligation the proceeds of which were used in the trade or business of the borrower shall be treated as a debt becoming worthless within
such taxable year for purposes of this section (except) that
subsection (d) [nonbusiness debts] shall not apply, but only if
the obligation of the borrower to person to whom such payment was made was worthless (without regard to such a guaranty, endorsement, or indemnity) at the time of such
payment.
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worthlessness of the debt was proximately related to it.l l Although Taxpayer had been heavily involved in financing arrangements during the years in issue,12 these arrangements were
all found by the court to be integral to Taxpayer's real estate
business. Hence, Taxpayer failed to offer evidence of a genuine
money lending business distinct from his real estate development business. The court relied on United States v. Henderson13 to determine that Taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or
business to lend money. In Henderson, the court determined
that although the taxpayer may have been in the business of
loaning money during the years in issue, the "taxpayer was not
involved in a continuous course of conduct of making loans, the
purpose of which was the derivation of profits." In addition, the
Henderson court listed the following facts that led to the finding
that the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business of lending money:
[N]either the taxpayer nor anyone acting on her
behalf ever actively sought out the loan business;
taxpayer never advertised that she was in a business of lending and did not maintain an office for
that purpose; taxpayer's activities in connection
with the making of loans during this period were
not treated as a business separated from her other
interests-a separate office was not maintained,
separate business books of account were not kept,
and statements showing profit or loss from loan
activities were not prepared; and finally, most of
the borrowing was either by social or business
acquaintances. 14

Relying on the reasoning and factors listed in Henderson,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Taxpayer had not been engaged in a separate trade or business of lending money. The
court further determined that even if Taxpayer were able to
show a genuine money lending business, the loans in question
would still not be proximately related to that business. lIS
11. See I.R.C. 166(d)(2).
12. Taxpayer generally used two methods of financing the sale of tract homes, the
conditional sales contract and direct sale with financing. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 985,986
(1975).
13. 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
14. ld. at 41 (emphasis added).
15. Even if a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of loaning money, it is well
established that the particular loan in issue must be "proximately" related to that trade
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Having found tha.t Taxpayer had not been involved in a
genuine money lending business apart from his land development business, the court then addressed the more critical issue
of whether Taxpayer's loans were made in connection with his
real estate development business. On this issue Taxpayer contended that his dominant and sole motive, as required by
United States v. Generes,16 in advancing loans to his father and
SVH was to capitalize on land opportunities his father's corporation had undertaken at Serene Lakes, California, for his own
profit. Taxpayer supported his assertion that a joint venture had
in fact materialized between Taxpayer and his father by pointing out that the project had the possibility of grossing over six
million dollars. The court found this assertion unpersuasive,
however, because Taxpayer failed to offer convincing evidence
that he expected to share profits as a joint venturer in the project. Citing Hogue v. Commissioner,17 the court reasoned that
Taxpayer's "unrelated joint ventures with his father in the past
does not, without more, prove one in this case. " I 8
or business. United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 41-42 (5th Cir. 1976). The Ninth
Circuit in Hunsaker reasoned that unlike Taxpayer's other lending activity, the loans to
his father and SVH were not connected with financing purchases from Taxpayer. This
was evidenced by the fact that Taxpayer had not required security for credit he extended to his father and SVH as he would have done in the normal course of his real
estate business. Although not cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hunsaker, the court in Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1970) noted that if a debt is realistically
secured, there is a strong indication that repayment may be had other than out of possible future profits.
16. The Supreme Court in United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 103 (1972) held
that the question of whether 11 bad debt has a "proximate" relation to a taxpayer's trade
or business "is that of dominnnt motivation, and that significant motivation is not sufficient." Under Generes, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing that his dominant (not
merely significant) motivation in making the loans was to benefit his trade or business,
which in Hunsaker had been determined by the Tax Court to be real estate and land
development. The Generes Court stated: "The dominant-motivation standard has the
attribute of workability. It provides a guideline of certainty for the trier of fact. The trier
may then compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper emphasis to the
objective rather than the subjective." Id. at 104. See also Hogue v. Commissioner, 459
F.2d 932, 938 (10th Cir. 1972).
17. 459 F.2d 932, 937-38 (10th Cir. 1972).
18. The Hunsaker court further stated that:
[Taxpayer's] own real estate businesses at the times the loans
were made and the losses were sustained remained unaffected
by SVH and its activities. [Taxpayer's] own projects could not
have profited from any gain or income realized by SVH or resulting from the use of [Taxpayer's] loans that are in issue
here. Likewise, his own projects would not have had to share
any losses incUITed by SVH. In fact, any effects the survival
and success of SVH might have had on [Taxpayer] were all
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Taxpayer further argued that his real estate business somehow depended on SVH's survival, and that this dependence provided the necessary connection between the loans and his real
estate business. This claim was based on Dorminey v. Commissioner,19 a "source of supply case." In Dorminey, the taxpayer,
who was in the wholesale produce business was having trouble
obtaining bananas required for his business. He therefore helped
organize, bought stock in, and advanced money to a corporation
which in turn promised to supply the taxpayer with all the bananas he required. The Dorminey court found that taxpayer's
dominant motive in making the loans, which were later uncollectible, was to insure a source o(supply of bananas for his produce business, and thus allowed the losses to be treated as business bad debts. However, the Hunsaker court determined that
the principals of Dorminey were inapplicable to Taxpayer. Although Taxpayer and his father were both in the business of
land development, Taxpayer failed to establish that his real estate business depended on the survival of SVH, even though he
claimed he anticipated sharing in the future profits of the corporation. The fact remained that Taxpayer failed to show any
profit sharing relationship between SVH and his father. Furthermore, citing Lundgren v. Commissioner,20 the court noted
that unlike in the source of supply cases, the anticipated benefits to Taxpayer's trade or business were not real and direct as a
matter of law.21
Finally, the Ninth Circuit addressed Taxpayer's contention
that the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in rejecting his ununrelated to his real estate business: the repayment of his
loans plus eight percent interest, filial satisfaction from the
protection of his father's investment, and the expectation of
future benefits either from future business with his father, or
from general enhancement of his father's estate.
615 F.2d at 1257. See also United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 41-42 (5th Cir.
1967).
19. 26 T.C. 940 (1956).
20. 376 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1967). In Lundgren, the taxpayer, in an attempt to
expand into a new area, made advances to a newly-formed timber business in South
Dakota. The court held that the anticipated benefits to the taxpayer's already existing
timber business, which expansion into a new area was expected to bring, was real and
direct.
21. The Hunsaker court noted that even the speculative benefits Taxpayer contemplated "would have been personal" and "not related to his trade or business." 615 F.2d
at 1257.
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contradicted and unimpeached testimony that his dominant motive in making the loans was to profit his land development
company.22
The court acknowledged that under Imbesi v. Commissioner,28 the Tax Court may have had a duty to consider Taxpayer's testimony even though it may be self-serving. However,
it could also consider objective circumstances surrounding the
loans in issue.24 The (!ourt found that the circumstances surrounding the loans supported the inference drawn by the Tax
CoUrt, although the Tax Court's holding was inconsistent with
Taxpayer's testimony that his dominant motive was to aid his
father's ailing corporation. Hence, "the Tax Court was not required to believe taxpayer."
The court went on to say that the objective facts relied on
by the Tax Court in determining Taxpayer's dominant motive in
22. On this issue Taxpayer relied principally on Foran v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
705 (5th Cir. 1948) and Ross v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955). In Foran the
court of appeals stated:
His testimony is consistent with everY proven fact. He
gives a credible reason why it was not for sale and why finally
in 1941 he did sell it. We think the court's refusal to follow the
sworn testimony is contrarY to law, and requires the setting
aside of its fact-finding as it would that of a jUrY.
Id. at 706. However, the Foralt court further stated: "We recognize that intent may be
proved by circumstances, and that a party's testimony as to his intent may be rebutted
by proof of circumstances which are inconsistent therewith." Id. at 707.
23. 361 F.2d 640, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1966). The Imbesi court remanded the case because it found that the taxpayer's testimony was not credited. The court stated that:
the primarY intent or motive of the taxpayer has always been
the ultimate test for determining whether losses are deductible because incurred in a trade or business or in transactions
for profit, or on the other hand are not deductible because
they are personal expenses •••. A taxpayer's direct testimony
that profit making was his primarY purpose, although it suffers from the heavy burden of being self-serving, is not to be
put aside without consideration simply because there exists
other evidence of some objective circumstances. The evidence
must be considered and evaluated as a whole.
24. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 104 (1972) ("[the trier of fact must] give
proper emphasis to the objective rather than the subjective"). See also, Road Materials
Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1124 (4th Cir. 1969) ("intention to create a debt
cannot be so readily proved •••. Generally it depends upon whether contemporaneous
facts, not testimony given years later, establish an unconditional obligation to repay advances."). The Road Materials court affirmed a determination by the Tax Court tha~
advances made to the taxpayer's wholly-owned corporation were contributions to capital
even though the advances were shown as loans on the taxpayer's books.
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making the loans could be framed in terms of the "risk v. potential reward" analysis put forth in Generes . The facts that SVH
was seriously undercapitalized at the time Taxpayer made the
loans and that Taxpayer required no security for these loans was
strong evidence that the big profits Taxpayer anticipated were
mere expectations of future benefits, thus negating a dominant
business motive. The court also noted that Taxpayer's father,
who had over three and a half million dollars invested in SVH,
would have shown some gratitude if the corporation had prospered. However, the fact remained that the benefits were contingent on the success of SVH. Based on these facts the court held
that the inference drawn by the Tax Court that TaXpayer's
dominant motive was to aid his father and his father's ailing corporation was not erroneous and thus binding.2~

The Government's Cross-Appeal
The government's cross-appeal raised the issue of whether
the Tax Court erred in holding that payments made by Taxpayer as guarantor on the performance bonds were deductible
under section 166(f) of the Code. Section 166(f) provides a limited exception to the general rule of section 166(d) that a noncorporate taxpayer must treat a nonbusines bad debt as a short
term capitalloss.26
The court in Hunsaker, determined that Taxpayer would be
entitled to a business bad debt deduction under section 166(f) if
all the following requirements had been met: (1) the guarantor,
endorser, or indemnitor making payment (Taxpayer) was not a
corporation; (2) the borrower (Patty and Taxpayer's father) was
not a corporation; (3) the proceeds of the original obligation
were used in the trade or business of the borrower; and (4) the
obligation of the borrower to the creditor (county and General
Insurance Company) was worthless at the time of payment,
without regard to the guaranty.
25. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
26. For taxable years beginning in 1976, and thereafter, the status of guarantee obligations will be determined in accordance with the following rule as prepared by the staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, H.R. REP. No. 18612, 94th Cong., 2d SeBS. 157
(1976). Where a taxpayer has a loss arising from the satisfaction of a guarantee, he will
receive the same tax treatment as when he has a lOBS from a direct loan. The underlying
rationale apparently is that the giving of a guarantee is but an indirect method of financing. Gillespie v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1025 (1970).
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The court determined that there was no dispute as to the
first two requirements having been met, and declined to consider, the third requirement because it had not been in issue
before the Tax Court. The court then focused its attention on
the fourth requirement under section 166(f)-that the obligation
of the borrower to the cretlitor be worthless at the time of payment, without regard to the guaranty.27
The Tax Court had failed to determine whether the obligation of Patty as principal on the bond was worthless to the creditor, General Insurance Company. The court reasoned that the
only principal in essence was Taxpayer's father, due to Taxpayer's hold harmless agreement with Patty and the fact that
Patty was principal in name only to comply with local law.
However, the Ninth Circuit determined that Patty's reason
for signing the bonds, and his freedom from ultimate liability
due to Taxpayer's hold harmless agreement, did "not justify ignoring, for purposes of section 166(f), the fact that Patty was
legally bound to the County Water District as principal on the
obligation."2s Furthermore, the fact that ultimate liability would
fall on Taxpayer due to his own hold harmless agreement with
Patty "does not make worthless the obligation which is the focus
of ... section 166(f)." Moreover, "[s]ection 166(f) does not permit [t] axpayer to recoup via favorable tax status any extra losses
he incurred as a result of a collateral agreement he made with
Patty after the bonds and guaranty were signed." The court further pointed out that I~ven indemnitors who never had a right to
reimbursement against the principal debtors, "must show the
worthlessness of the original obligation in order to benefit from
section 166(f)."
27. See Andrew v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 239, 247 (1970), which stated the general
rule relied on by the Ninth Circuit court in Hunsaker that § 166(f) of the Code requires
that the original obligation between the principal and the creditor be worthless, rather
than the guarantor's or indemnitor's claim against the principal obligor.
28. The Hunsaker court further reasoned that "[t]he local governments had good
reason to require the land title-owner to be on the bonds, if for no other reason than to
reach the land, if necessary, to satisfy any unmet liability. Thus the creditors could have
looked to Patty for repayment." 615 F.2d at 1259. It is unclear whether the court would
still have required Taxpayer to show the worthlessness of Patty's obligation to the credi~
tor if it were determined that Patty signed the bond merely as a formality.
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The court then distinguished Andrew v. Commissioner,29
which had held for the taxpayer. In Andrew, the taxpayer was
allowed section 166(f) deductibility by showing that the creditors' claims against the principal debtors were worthless, despite
the fact that the surety, whom the taxpayer agreed to indemnify,
had not been first called upon to pay the creditors. The Tax
Court stated its rationale in Andrew as follows: "By paying the
customers directly, [taxpayer] merely telescoped the transaction,
and thereby avoided additional expenditures . .. that would
have arisen had the surety first been called upon to liquidate the
customers' claims."80 However, the court in Hunsaker reasoned
that Taxpayer had not attempted to "telescope" anything, but
had attempted to avoid the stringent requirements of section
166(f), and in effect nullify the distinction between a surety and
principal debtor, because there had been no showing of Patty's
insolvency.
Finding that the Tax Court had erred in ignoring Patty's
status as principal on the bonds, the court reversed the decision,
permitting section 166(f) deductibility of Taxpayer's payments
as guarantor. The court also remanded the case to provide Taxpayer an opportunity to show, if possible, that Patty's obligation
was worthless at the time of payment. If this is not shown, Taxpayer's loss will be entitled to only short-term capital loss treatment as a nonbusiness debt under section 166(d).
D. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING IN DENYING THE
PAYER BUSINESS BAD DEBT Loss

TAX-

Inference that Intrafamity Loans are Nonbusiness Bad Debts
In analyzing the court's reasons for denying Taxpayer a
business bad debt loss under section 166(a)(1) of the Code, it is
important to note the strong inference that intrafamily loans are
nonbusiness debts. 31 Therefore, uncollectab1e intrafamily loans
29. Andrew v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 239 (1970).
30. Id. at 247.
31. If a taxpayer's motive is to help a member of his family, there is a strong inference that the debt is a nonbusiness debt. Estate of Broadhead v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d
841 (5th Cir. 1968): Goldman v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 181 (1962); Mercil v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1150 (1955); Clark v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 780 (1952). In Rude
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165 (1967) the Tax Court intimated a presumption that a
transaction between related parties is a gift. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 195,
201 (1963) the Supreme Court stated that the leading case of Putnam v. Commissioner,
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are either deductibile as nonbusiness bad debts under section
166(d) of the Code, or not at all when the parties are found to
have contemplated a gift transaction.
The Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 stated the following as to intra-family loans:
Generally, in the case of a direct loan, the
transaction is entered into for profit by the
lender, who hopes to realize interest on the loan.
However, this may not be true in the case of loans
made between friends or family members, and in
these cases thl~ Internal Revenue Service will generally treat any loss resulting from such a "loan"
as a gift, with respect to which no bad debt deduction is available.82

Section 166(1)(a) of the Code is not rendered inapplicable,
however, because a taxpayer lends money to a member of his or
her family.33 In order for a taxpayer to overcome the strong inference of a gift, the taxpayer must successfully demonstrate
that he or she was engaged in a trade or business when the debt
was created or acquired and that the losses from the debt bear a
direct relation to that trade or business.34 In addition, the Su352 U.S. 82, 90-92 (1956),
was intended to accomplish far more than to deny full deductibility to the worthless debts of family and friends. It was
designed to make full deductibility of a bad debt turn upon its
proximate connection with activities which the tax laws recognize as a trade or business, a concept which falls far short of
reaching every income or profit making activity.
See also Caligiuri v. Commissioner, 549 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 78-173, 1978-11.R.B. 213 at 73; Briskin,
How Advanced Planning Can Yield Mrueimum Tax Benefits Out of Losses on Stock or
Debts, 50 J. TAX. 236, 236-40 (1979); Hampson, Estate and Gift Taxation-The Use of
Intrafamily Loan in Estate Planning, 56 TAXES 389 (1978).
32. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL ExPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr
OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 18612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1976).
33. White v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) (1971); Andrew v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 239 (1970).
34. Levin v. United States, 597 F.2d 760, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.1665(b)(2) (1959) provides in part:
[T)he question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each particular case . • • For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to
be determined by the relation which the loss resulting from
the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of
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preme Court in United States v. Generes 35 required that the
proximate business relationship provide the dominant motivation for the indebtedness.38
In Hunsaker, Taxpayer claimed business bad debt loss on
several theories, but the court found all arguments without
merit. Taxpayer failed to establish either a separate lending business, the existence of a joint venture, or the dependence of his
business on the success or failure of his father's corporation.
Furthermore, the court held that the objective factors surrounding the transaction-undercapitalization, unsecured debt, and
profit contingent on success of borrower's trade or business-supported the Tax Court's inference that Taxpayer's
dominant motive was to aid his father's company and not his
own.

Failure of the Taxpayer to Establish A Separate Lending
Business
The taxpayer has the burden of establishing a trade or business. 37 In determining what constitutes a trade or business, no
single factor determinative. However, the activities constituting
a trade or business must occupy a subsantial amount of a taxpayer's time. 38 In [mel v. Commissioner, nine loans over a four
year period were held insufficient lending activity to establish a
genuine money lending business.39
the taxpayer. H that relation is a proximate one in the conduct
of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at
the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes within
the exception provided by that subparagraph.
See also Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. at 200-01 n.9; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1943).
35. In Generes, 405 U.S. at 1M, the Supreme Court reasoned:
[B]y making the dominant motivation the measure, the logical
tax consequence ensues and prevents the mere presence of a
business motive, however small and however insignificant,
from controlling the tax result at the taxpayer's convenience.
This is of particular importance in a tax system that is so
largely dependent on voluntary compliance.
36. See also Hogue v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 932, 937 (lOth Cir. 1972).
37. Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
39. 61 T.C. 318 (1973). In Jessup v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (P-H) 1177,289 (1977),
31 loan transactions in a 10-year period was held sufficient to establish a lending business. See also United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Although Taxpayer was heavily involved in financing arrangements during the years in issue, all of these arrangements
were correctly determined to be integral to Taxpayer's real estate business. Taxpayer never actively sought out a separate
lending business, advertised, or maintained a separate office for
that purpose. Furthermore, no separate books were kept and
Taxpayer failed to produce statements of profits and losses from
his loan activities. The fact that Taxpayer had notes receivable
did not ipso facto evidence a separate money lending business.

Joint Venture Never Established
A determination of a business bad debt may be based solely
on anticipated success of a joint venture, even though such anticipation flows from an excess of confidence.4o However, the creation of a joint venture must still be adequately supported by
evidence,41 and all factors must be considered. "It is well established that there are four basic attributes which are indicative of
a joint venture: (1) a contract, expressed or implied, that a joint
venture be formed; (2) the contribution of money, property and/
or services by the venturers; (3) an agreement for joint
propritorship and control; and (4) an agreement to share
profits. "42
The Tax Court noted that there may have been discussions
between Taxpayer and his father to form a joint venture, however, the fact remains that no venture actually materialized. Preliminary discussions of a joint venture are not sufficient evidence
to establish its existence.48 Taxpayer failed to offer evidence of
decisions relating to capital contributions, the sharing of profits
and losses, and decisions as to joint proprietorship and control.
Although Taxpayer had a history of forming partnerships and
40. Down v. United States, 328 F;2d 314 (9th Cir. 1962).
41. The burden of showing a joint venture is upon the taxpayer asserting its existence as a basis for deduction of losses incurred. Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d
45 (lOth Cir. 1967). Note that I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) define "partnership" as including joint ventures. For a treatnlent of the family partnership problem, see Commissioner
v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Beck v. Chemical Equip. Corp., 27 T.C. 840 (1957).
42. S. & M. Plumbing Co. Inc., v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 702, 707 (1971). See also
Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429 (1976); Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621
(D.S.D. 1963); Briskin, How Advanced Planning Can Yield Maximum Tax Benefits Out
of Losses on Stock or Debts, 50 J. TAX. 236 (1978).
43. Hogue v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d at 932; Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067
(1964).
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other ventures with his father, he offered no independent evidence aside from his oral testimony that a joint venture had in
fact been established in this case.
Source of Supply

Taxpayer also failed to establish that his real estate business depended on the success or failure of his father's corporation. A comparison of two cases which allowed bad debt deductions based on a "source of supply" theory indicate that
Taxpayer failed to establish any such relationship between insuring development projects for his own business, and the success of his father's corporation. In Garlove v. Commissioner,44
the Tax Court allowed a business bad debt deduction where the
taxpayer, a lawyer, loaned funds to a client to allow the client to
stay in business. The funds were later uncollectibile. The Tax'
Court reasoned that the business basis for the loans was evidenced by the substantial fees the taxpayer received from his
client. Thus, the benefits to the taxpayer's business stemming
from these loans were found to be real and direct. In Estate of
Saperstain v. Commissioner,4r. the Tax Court also allowed a taxpayer a business bad debt deduction based on "source of supply." The taxpayer in Saperstain, a sports promoter and owner
of the Harlem Globtrotters, made advances to a newly created
professional basketball league. The proximate business basis for
these loans was found to be that the new league would provide
teams to compete with the Globetrotters.4&
Unlike the above cases, the anticipated benefits contemplated by Taxpayer as a result of his relationship with his father
were merely speculative. Taxpayer had failed to establish a
profit sharing relationship with his father. The only return
promised to Taxpayer was eight percent interest on the notes,
which could hardly establish a case for the dependence of Taxpayer's business on his father's, based on a "source of supply
theory."
44. 65 T.C.M. (P-H) .. 65,201 (1965).
45. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) .. 916,(1970).
46. See also Hogue v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1972) (taxpayer, an
accountant, unable to show relationship of loans to obtain new clients); Com Prods. Ref.
Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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Contemporaneous Factors vs. Subjective Intent
Taxpayer correctly contended that his self-serving testimony was entitled to be considered!'1 Yet a court may look at all
objective factors surrotmding the transaction, and ~timately,
the objective factors take precedence in determining the dominant motivation of a taxpayer at the time of the transaction.48
Moreover, in the recent case of Levin v. United States, the court
stated: "Clearly the standard is to be objective and not subjective. To this end, Generes specifically warns that self-serving
statements alone will not suffice to prove a taxpayer's business
purpose in advancing money."49
.
In Levin, the taxpayer's self-serving testimony was properly
discounted. The taxpayer claimed that religious reasons precluded him from charging interest, but objective facts tended to
prove that he did not treat the advances in a businesslike manner. He waited three years after the statute of limitations ran
before he enforced the debt, claiming he did not need the money
until then.
An examination of the objective factors surrounding the
Hunsaker transaction are indicative that the court reached the
correct result in upholding the Tax Court's inference that Taxpayer's dominant motive was to aid his father's corporation.
Taxpayer's transaction was overshadowed by objective factors:
undercapitalization of his father's corporation, severe cash flow
difficulties, security for indebtedness not required, and profit
contingent on success. Although the court did not specifically
state that anyone factor alone was controlling, the presence of
two or more of these factors in a given transaction between
friends or related parties may certainly be sufficient to negate a
taxpayer's sworn testimony to the contrary.

Unsecured Debt
Perhaps the must critical factor considered by the court in
47. In characterizing a business bad debt, objective factors along with evidence of
intent must be considered. Canco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528 (1st
Cir. 1976). See also Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Crr. 1966).
48. Harshy v. United States, 590 F.2d 884 (10th Crr. 1979). See also Smith v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1966) (objective contemporaneous criteria must be considered and accorded great weight).
49. Levin v. United States, 597 F.2d at 766.
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denying Taxpayer business bad debt loss was the fact that Taxpayer failed to secure the obligation. The fact that a party has
sought to protect his creditor status by obtaining security
strongly enhances the possibility that its advances will be considered a business debt. 110 As a practical matter, loans between
family members should always be evidenced by security. Hunsaker indicates that interest alone may not be sufficient. The
court specifically stated that even if the Tax Court had been
willing to assume a separate lending business, the loans advanced to Taxpayer's father would still not be proximately related to that business primarily because of the absence of security for these advances. lIl
Had Taxpayer realistically secured the debt by requiring
real estate or land options from his father, a more compelling
argument could have been made that Taxpayer acted purely out
of an economic desire to profit in his own land business.

Undercapitilization-Negative Cash Flow
Thin capitalization of Taxpayer's father's corporation was
also found to be a critical element in discounting Taxpayer's testimony that he acted out of a pure profit motive. Taxpayer extended large sums of money to his father's corporation, which
was severely undercapitalized and continually experienced cash
flow shortages. The inference to be drawn here is that prudent,
profit-oriented lenders do not in the ordinary course of their
business make loans to risky businesses without requiring security. Although "thin capitalization of a corporation to which Cal
taxpayer makes an advance, will not alone justify the indebtedness as a nonbusiness debt, it is very strong evidence."112
Here, it is important to note the overlapping significance
between cases involving loans made to family and friends, and
cases involving the issue of whether advances by a stockholder
to a closely held corporation are to be considered debts or contributions to capital. The Hunsaker court expressly stated that
the distinction between these two types of cases amounts to little difference when "[o]ther motives might well be involved in
50. Bordo Prods. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1312 (Ct. CI. 1973).
51. 615 F.2d at 1256 n.2.
52. Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir. 1968).
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any given case, such as personal desire to aid friend or family
through tough times. "liS
In United States v. Henderson,M a case factually similar to
Hunsaker, the taxpayer was a shareholder in her grandson-inlaw's closely held corporation, and advanced large sums of
money at a time when her grandson-in-law's foundry corporation was operating at a loss. Despite the fact that the corporation continued to lose money, she continued to make large advances. Moreover, the taxpayer did not require security for these
advances, and repayment was expected only when and if the corporation showed a profit. Consequently, Henderson was denied a
bad debt loss, and her advancements were properly treated as
capital investments. 1I11

Thus, in Hunsaker, the fact that SVH was seriously undercapitalized at the time Taxpayer extended large sums of money
without requiring secw'ity as he customarily did in his real estate business, cut sharply against Taxpayer.
Further Considerations
If repayment of an advance by a taxpayer is contingent on

the success of the borrower's trade or business, the advancement
is generally treated as a nonbusiness debt. 1I8 In Rolwing-Moxley
Co. v. United States,II'1 the Eighth Circuit denied the taxpayer a
bad debt loss deductiolrl where it was found that repayment was
predicated on the borrower's financial success, and the debt was
unsecured.
53. 615 F.2d at 1256 n.3.
54. 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
55. 1.R.C. § 165(g) provides:

Worthless Securities.(1) General rule.-If any security which is a capital asset
becomes worthlesB during the taxable year, the loss resulting
therefrom shall, for purposes of this subtitle, be treated as a
loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable
year, of a capital asset.
(2) Security de/ined.-For purposes of this subsection,
the term "security" means(A) a share of stock in a corporation.
56. In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Diamond Bros. Co. v.
Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1963).
57. 589 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1978).
(g)
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Although not stated in the Hunsaker opinion, a further con~
sideration is the liklihood of an independent lender advancing
money to a particular debtor in question. In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Woamack,lSs the Tax Court considered the extreme unlikelihood of an independent lender lending under similar circumstances, and denied the taxpayer a bad debt loss.
Likewise, in Hunsaker, it appears extremely unlikely that Taxpayer's father could have procured similar unsecured loans from
an independant lending institution, in light of the severe undercapitilization and cash flow dfficulties of his corporation.
Significance

Because it is the policy of the courts to scrutinize intrafamily loans in great detail, tax practioners should determine
if the loan is evidenced by a note that is realistically secured and
backed by proof that the borrower is solvent, that repayment is
expected and not contingent on the success of the borrower's
trade or business, and that an independant lender would be
likely to lend under similar circumstances. Absence of one or
more of these factors in a family context is likely to lead to nonbusiness bad debt treatment under section I66(d) of the Code,
and may even justify a court in finding that the parties intended
a gift, for which no deduction will be allowed.1S9
With respect to Taxpayer's payments as guarantor, the
court's analysis was straightforward. There were two joint principals on the bonds which Taxpayer had agreed to guarantee.
The Tax Court correctly found that Taxpayer's father's obligation was worthless as required by I66(f) of the Code,60 but failed
58. 31 AFTR 2d 73-471 (D.Va. 1972), al/'d, 33 AFTR 2d 74-999 (4th Cir. 1974); see
also Roads Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1969); Servlow v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (P-H) '!I 80-564 (1980) (likelihood of obtaining outside financing considered in denying taxpayer's bad debt loss deduction).
59. See Hetherington v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 806 (1930); Levitz v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) '!I 52,268 (1968). See also Redeldheimer v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (P-H) '!I 64,060 (1964) (repayment not expected nor intended, therefore parties
contemplated a gift).
60. See I.R.C. § 166(f); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-6 (1957). I.R.C. § 166(f) provides a limited exception to the general rule of Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1965) that
losses incurred on guarantee agreements prior to 1976 are deductible from ordinary income only if the guarantee was related to taxpayer's trade or business. Therefore under
I.R.C. § 166(f) a noncorporate guarantor or indemnitor of a noncorporate obligation
which is issued in furtherance of the borrower's trade or business may be treated as a
business debt without regard to the business versus nonbusiness analysis.
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to make this determination as to the second principal, Patty,
reasoning that he was merely a straw man in the transaction for
the purpose of complying with local law. The Ninth Circuit
properly rejected Taxpayer's reasoning, finding that the local
governments "had good reason" to require the titleholder's signature on the bonds, "if for no other reason than to reach the
land ... to satisfy any unmet liability."61
It is well established that section 166(f) deductibility is triggered by the worthlessness of the principal debt, and no deduction can be taken unless the principal debt is in fact worthless.62
In Horne v. Commissioner,63 the Ninth Circuit denied a taxpayer, as indemnitor, section 166(f) deductibility for failure to
show that the underlying obligation of the borrower to the creditor was in fact worthless.
Furthermore, legislative history of section 166(f) provides:
This subsection will allow a deduction from a
gross income for a loss suffered by a noncorporate
taxpayer through payment during the taxable
year of part or all of his obligation as guarantor,
endorser, or indemnitor of a noncorporate obligation. In order to obtain an ordinary loss, the taxpayer must establish that the proceeds were used
in the trade or business of the borrower and that
the obligation of the borrower, to whom the taxpayer made payment in discharge of his guarantor's obligation, was worthless at the time of payment (without regard to the guaranty,
endorsement, or indemnity).M

Thus, for guarantee, endorsement, and indemnity agreements entered into before 1976,65 a taxpayer is required to show
61. 615 F.2d at 1259.
62. Home v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Pullman
Trust & Savs. Bank v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill., 1963, afT'a, 338 F.2d
666 (1963).
63. 523 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. S. REp. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1954) (emphasis added); see also
Note, What to Do About Bad Debts, 13 N.Y.U. TAX mST. 109, 129 (1955).
65. In the case of noncorporate guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor agreements entered into after 1975, the following rules apply:
(1) A worthless debt will qualify as a business bad debt if
it is established that the dominant motive for guaranteeing
the debt was proximately related to the guarantor's trade or
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the worthlessness of the original obligation between the principal and creditor before an ordinary loss can be taken. Moreover,
where a taxpayer is guarantor for an obligation involving two or
more principals, he must be prepared to show the worthlessness
of all of the above obligations so long as there is some reasonable
basis requiring each of these principals to be part of the
transaction.

E.

CONCLUSION

In Hunsaker, Taxpayer claimed a business bad debt loss on
several creative theories. However, the Ninth Circuit properly
held, based on the lack of evidence and objective factors surrounding the transaction, that Taxpayer was not entitled to business loss under section 166(1)(a) of the Code. Furthermore, with
respect to payments made by Taxpayer as guarantor, the court
also reached the proper result in requiring him to establish the
worthlessness of the other principal's obligation to the creditor
since that principal was a vital party to the transaction.

Robert Michael Fanucci*

IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
o

In Redwood Empire Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Commisszoner, 628 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1980), the taxpayer purchased
business.
(2) A worthless debt will qualify as a nonbusiness bad
debt if it is established that the guaranty transaction was entered into for profit but not as part of the guarantor's trade or
business.
(3) H the guarantor has a right of subrogation or other
similar right against the maker (debtor), no bad debt deduction will be allowed until the year in which the right against
the maker becomes worthless. H the guarantor has no right
against the maker, the payment under the guaranty agreement
is deductible for the year in which the payment is made.
(4) H the guaranty agreement was entered into without
consideration as an accommodation to a friend or relative, no
deduction loss will be allowed.
.
STAND. FEn. TAX REP. (CCH) Bad Debts lJ 1631 (1980).
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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Malibu Springs Ranch in 1967 for $750,000 and sold it in 1972
for $277,539. During this time, the taxpayer paid legal fees for
what the Tax Court held was a lawsuit to defend or protect title
to the property, and llot to defend a charge of fraud by the
Malibu Springs seller as the taxpayer claimed. The taxpayer settled the suit· in 1972 for $300,000, and treated the loss on the
sale and the expenses in defending and settling the lawsuit as
deductible ordinary business expenses. The Commissioner denied such treatment.
The taxpayer had argued that the Malibu Springs property
was held "primarily fo:r sale to customers in the ordinary course
of [its] trade or business," I.R.C. § 1221(1), or alternatively, that
the purchase and sale .of the property was an integral part of its
business of making loams, and therefore subject to ordinary loss
treatment under the Corn Products doctrine, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
Because the taxpayer l~ecorded its purchase of the property persuant to seeton 6705 of the California Financial Code, which authorizes savings and loan associations to invest in specific kinds
of residential property in order to assist in the generation of
loans, the taxpayer argued that the property was necessarily
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the
business of making loans.
The Ninth Circuit held that even if the taxpayer did acquire or develop the property for the purposes authorized by the
statute; which it had not, such purpose would not be determinative of whether the property was held primarily for sale to customers. The court held that the taxpayer's actual purpose for
acquiring, holding, and selling the property controlled in determining whether the property was held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. Finding the Tax
Court's determination that the taxpayer acquired Malibu
Springs as part of a scheme to defraud the prior owners of the
property not to be clearly erroneous, and finding that the taxpayer at no time considered developing the property for the purpose of generating loans, the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer did not meet the test. The loss could therefore not qualify
as an ordinary business loss because the property was a capital
asset. In addition, because the loan factor involved in the sale of
the property was an incidental and not an integral part of the
taxpayer's business of making loans, the Ninth Circuit found no
factual basis for the application of the Corn Products doctrine.
In addressing the taxpayer's claim to deduction of legal fees
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and settlement costs, the court of appeals rejected the taxpayer's
disguised "dominant purpose" test. The court stated that as a
general rule, legal expenses incurred in defending against a claim
of fraud that would injure or destroy a business have been held
to be ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, legal
expenses and settlement payments which are incurred to protect
or defend title are non-deductible capital expenditures. As a test
to determine whether legal fees and settlement expenses in a
case such as this are deductible, the Ninth Circuit held that one
must examine the original and nature of the claim, rather than
the taxpayer's dominant purpose in defending the lawsuit. In
agreeing with the Tax Court's finding that the lawsuit originated
in the transactions by which the taxpayer acquired Malibu
Springs and that the fraud claim challenged the validity of the
taxpayer's title to the property, the court held the purpose of
the defense and settlement was to defend and protect title.
Therefore, the legal expenses and settlement costs were capital
outlays persuant to section 162(a) and were not deductible business expenses.
In Dwyer v. United States, 606 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1980), the
federal government appealed from a district court decision that
the taxpayers were entitled to a refund for federal income taxes
collected for the tax year 1968. The issues before the court involved tax consequences stemming from the liquidation of a corporation by the taxpayer and his son, and in particular, the effect of the taxpayer's forgiveness of interest on debts owed him
by the corporation. The court of appeals held that the taxpayer
had realized ordinary income where the interest forgiveness took
place simultaneously with the liquidation of the corporation.
In March 1966, the taxpayer and his son each invested
$50,000 and formed a corporation. As the corporation needed
more operating capital, the taxpayer contributed additional
funds on an "open account" in exchange for five year debentures, each bearing a five percent rate of interest. The corporation, an accrual method taxpayer, recorded the interest on the
loans as follows:
Date
December 31, 1966
December 31, 1967
December 31, 1968
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Amount
$5,000.00
$16,041.66
$17,833.37
TOTAL $35,875.03

71

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 14

454

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:451

Late in 1968, the corporation entered into an agreement
with a purchaser which called for the sale of the corporation's
major assets, followed immediately by liquidation. The liquidation and sale took place simultaneously on December 30, 1968.
On that date, the corporation owed the taxpayer the following
amounts:
Debentures
Open Account
Interest
TOTAL

$400,000.00
$170,000.00
$38,875.03
$608,875.03

Also on December 30, 1968 the following events took place: 1)
the corporation sold its assets for $700,000; 2) the corporation
paid the taxpayer the $400,000 due on the outstanding debentures; 3) the corporation paid the taxpayer $170,000 in payment
of the "open account"; 4) the taxpayer and his wife forgave the
$38,875.03 interest owed in a document entitled "Forgiveness of
Indebtedness"; and 5) the corporation retired its common stock
in complete liquidation by paying $65,000 to the taxpayer and
his son.
The sole issue before the court of appeals was the personal
income tax consequences to the taxpayer as a result of the liquidation of the corporation. The court found that in the absence
of the purported interest forgiveness, the taxpayer would have
realized. additional ordinary income of $38,875.03. Clearly, the
corporation owed the taxpayer a legitimate debt, and had the
money to pay the debt as it distributed the proceeds of the liquidation. Primarily because the taxpayer excercised significant
control over the corporation, the court of appeals held that the
taxpayer received ordinary income under the doctrine associated
with the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940). See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The
forgiveness of interest in order to change the characterization of
the assets was analogous to an anticipatory assignment of income and therefore invalid.
The taxpayer did not directly challenge the applicability of
Helvering, however. He claimed that because the corporation
was unable to doubt the interest accrued during 1966 and 1967
(it did not meet the requirements of section 267(a)(2), it would
be unfair to disregard his purported forgiveness and require the
recognition of ordinrury income, while the corporation was unable
to take the normal deduction. Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 652 (1976). In Putoma the shareholders forgive an in-
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debtedness. However, there was no immediate liquidation of the
corporation and receipt of the assets by the shareholders. The
forgiveness was for bona fide business purposes, and the shareholders had no control over the disposition of the proceeds,
Thus, due to the control the taxpayer in Dwyer had over the
corporation, and the simultaneous liquidation of the corporation
and the forgiveness of the indebtedness, Putoma was inapposite.
The taxpayer was held to have realized ordinary income.
In United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1980), a
case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit resolved the question
of whether the privilege against self-incrimination may be maintained in an action for wilful failure to file an income tax return
under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1970). In Carlson, the taxpayer claimed
ninety-nine withholding exemptions on his W-4 form, although
he was not married and had no dependants. He refused to disclose the nature of these exceptions, claiming that such disclosure might lead to criminal liability for having filed false withholding forms.
The district judge found that the taxpayer "did not have a
good faith claim or reasonable ground for [asserting the] privilege . . . . " Thus, the taxpayer's claim was held not to constitute a defense to a section 7023 violation.
In Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662 (1976), the
Court determined that "[a] section 7203 conviction cannot be
based on a valid exercise of the privilege." However, the Garner
holding was specifically limited to "only those [claims of the
privilege against self-incrimination] justified by fear of self-incrimination other than under the tax laws."
After considering the history and purposes of the privilege
and the need for revenues, the court concluded that the taxpayer "attempted to take advantage of the privilege's protective
capacity to further a calculated effort to avoid the payment of
taxes."
The court further held that the taxpayer's failure to assert
his claim in good faith constituted wilful misconduct, and he was
therefore subject to the sanctions of section 7203 for willfully
failing to file an income tax return.
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